The Somali Monitor
Turkey’s Somalia Dilemma: Supporting the State or Sustaining Hassan Sheikh’s Presidency?
Turkey’s expanding economic and military influence has strengthened Somalia’s federal government, but weaknesses in institutional oversight, disputed constitutional reforms and allegations of foreign military involvement in domestic confrontations raise a consequential question: is Ankara building a stronger Somali state or reinforcing the political authority of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud?

Photo courtesy of Villa Somalia’s official X account
MOGADISHU, Somalia — October 27, 2026. Fifteen years after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s historic humanitarian visit during Somalia’s 2011 famine, Turkey has emerged as one of the country’s most influential foreign partners, with extensive interests in infrastructure, military development, maritime security and offshore energy. Yet its expanding strategic relationship with Mogadishu increasingly coincides with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s disputed constitutional reforms and confrontations with federal member states. The concern is not that Ankara has been proven to be deliberately sustaining Hassan Sheikh’s presidency, but that its military and economic assistance may be strengthening the incumbent executive faster than Somalia’s institutions can ensure such support serves the broader state.
Turkey’s transformation from humanitarian partner to strategic actor is reflected in its management of critical infrastructure, military training and resource agreements. Turkish companies Favori LLC and Albayrak Group secured concessions for Aden Adde International Airport and Mogadishu Seaport, respectively, while Ankara established the TURKSOM military training facility in 2017. The February 2024 Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement expanded cooperation in maritime security and naval development, followed by arrangements for offshore hydrocarbon exploration. These partnerships have provided Somalia with investment and technical capabilities, but they have also concentrated considerable economic and security influence in a relationship whose institutional accountability remains uneven. (Somalia Office of the Prime Minister, 2024; RUSI, 2026)
The clearest evidence of this imbalance comes from Somalia’s Auditor General. The 2022 financial audit identified the absence of independently audited financial statements from the airport and seaport concessionaires, limiting verification of the government’s contractual revenue entitlements. Under revised arrangements, Somalia was entitled to 25% of relevant airport revenues and 62.17% of port revenues. In August 2025, the Auditor General further reported that Albayrak Somalia had never submitted independently audited financial statements despite its contractual obligations. Although these findings do not establish financial misconduct, they expose persistent weaknesses in the state’s ability to verify revenues generated from strategic public assets. (Office of the Auditor General, Financial Audit Reports; Office of the Auditor General, August 2025)
Similar questions arise from Turkey’s expanding energy interests. According to a 2026 analysis by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the hydrocarbon arrangements permit recovery of up to 90% of petroleum production costs before profit-sharing, with Somalia’s royalty entitlement capped at 5% and exemptions from certain production bonuses. While offshore exploration carries considerable commercial risks, such provisions underscore the importance of transparent negotiations and independent constitutional scrutiny over agreements that could determine Somalia’s future resource revenues. The wider concern is institutional: foreign investment may expand the state’s economic opportunities without necessarily strengthening its capacity to regulate those investments. (RUSI, 2026)
Military cooperation has developed even more significantly. TURKSOM has trained thousands of Somali personnel, including Gorgor units, while Ankara has provided equipment and operational assistance. By April 2026, Turkey had confirmed the deployment of F-16 fighter aircraft, T129 attack helicopters and naval assets, marking an expansion from military training into advanced operational capabilities. Such assistance can strengthen Somalia’s counterterrorism and maritime security operations, but its domestic political implications depend on the constitutional authority and oversight governing its use. (Janes, April 2026)
This question has become particularly consequential under Hassan Sheikh’s presidency. Since returning to office in May 2022, President Hassan has pursued constitutional amendments, electoral restructuring and stronger federal authority, without adequate consultations with the federal members states. Supporters regard these initiatives as necessary to overcome institutional fragmentation, while opponents argue that they concentrate executive power and undermine federal consensus. Puntland rejected the March 2024 constitutional amendments, tensions with Jubaland intensified over regional political mandates, and further amendments in March 2026 extended presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years. The resulting dispute concerns not only Hassan Sheikh’s tenure but the constitutional distribution of authority between Mogadishu and federal member states. (Chatham House, October 2026)
The confrontation with South West State illustrates how these disagreements have increasingly acquired a military dimension. Following President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen’s break with Mogadishu over regional elections and political authority, federal forces entered Baidoa on March 30, 2026, dismantling his administration. Laftagareen subsequently resigned and departed for Kenya, while an allied interim administration was established. Federal authorities presented the intervention as restoring constitutional order; opponents regarded it as the military-backed removal of a regional leader who had challenged the presidency. (London School of Economics, May 2026)
Turkey’s relevance to this confrontation is supported by specific evidence. According to the Critical Threats Project’s October 22 assessment, Turkish-trained Gorgor forces, supported with air power strikes participated in the federal takeover of South West State. This does not establish Turkish command or authorization of the operation, but it demonstrates that military capabilities developed through Ankara’s assistance were employed in a contested domestic political intervention. The distinction matters, as opposition figures and South West State leaders argue that although Turkey cannot be held responsible for every operation conducted by Somali forces it has trained, their deployment in domestic political confrontations raises serious questions about the safeguards governing foreign-supported national security institutions, particularly when such forces are used to advance the federal executive’s political interests without any apparent objection from Ankara (Critical Threats Project, October 2026)
Allegations involving Turkish aircraft have made the relationship more politically sensitive. In September, Laftagareen’s representatives accused Turkey of conducting F-16 strikes against their forces near Baidoa. The allegations were reported by Baidoa Online but remained independently unverified; Chatham House subsequently described Turkish aircraft as allegedly involved in the fighting without confirmation from Ankara. Separately, a September 3 incident in Doolow prompted accusations involving Turkish-linked personnel, which the federal government disputed. According to the FIKIR Institute, opposition parliamentarians attempted to debate the incident, but the House of the People voted against placing it on its agenda. Speaker Jama later publicly defended Turkey, further intensifying perceptions that parliamentary oversight had become politically constrained. Neither incident conclusively establishes Turkish responsibility, but both demonstrate the growing controversy surrounding its military presence and the need for credible independent investigation. (Baidoa Online, September 2026; Chatham House, October 2026; FIKIR Institute, September 2026; Garowe Online, September 2026)
The subsequent political restructuring in Southwest state further complicated perceptions of Turkey’s relationship with the federal executive. Former parliamentary speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur Madobe was positioned to assume the Southwest presidency, while Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, commonly known as Jama, entered parliament through a contested replacement process and subsequently became speaker. Jama’s longstanding institutional relationship with Turkey is significant: an Ankara University graduate and former Somali diplomat in Turkey, he signed the February 2024 defence agreement as defence minister and later served as ports minister during discussions concerning Albayrak’s unresolved audit obligations. These connections do not establish Ankara’s involvement in his appointment, but they raise questions about parliamentary independence in scrutinizing agreements negotiated or administered by its own leadership. (London School of Economics, May 2026; Office of the Auditor General, August 2025)
These developments reveal a deeper contradiction in Somalia’s state-building process. Military assistance may improve the federal government’s operational capacity without resolving disputes over the legitimacy of its authority. Advanced aircraft and internationally trained forces can alter the balance between Mogadishu and regional administrations, but military superiority cannot substitute for a negotiated constitutional settlement. The continuing resistance to federal authority in parts of South West State illustrates the limits of coercive intervention, while the diversion of security resources into internal confrontations risks weakening the wider campaign against Al-Shabaab.
Turkey’s dilemma is further complicated by geopolitical competition across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Ankara maintains close relations with Mogadishu, while the United Arab Emirates has longstanding security and commercial partnerships with Puntland, Jubaland and Somaliland. The federal government’s January 2026 decision to annul UAE defence and security agreements, rejected by regional authorities, exposed these competing interests. Egypt’s expanding defence cooperation with Somalia, Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and the involvement of other Gulf powers add further complexity. As Chatham House observes, foreign military and political competition risks transforming Somalia’s internal disputes into a prolonged confrontation. (Chatham House, October 2026)
The underlying political economy is troubling. Federal authorities seek external partnerships to consolidate national institutions, while regional administrations cultivate foreign relationships to protect their autonomy and economic interests. Foreign governments pursue access to ports, resources, security partnerships and strategic influence. Domestic fragmentation consequently creates opportunities for external involvement, while competing foreign assistance may provide additional resources that sustain the very political divisions it is ostensibly intended to overcome. Turkey’s expanding investments give Ankara legitimate interests in a stable federal partner, but excessive dependence on the incumbent administration risks associating those interests with Hassan Sheikh’s political fortunes rather than Somalia’s long-term institutional development.
This shift is already affecting Turkey’s public image. Demonstrations involving the burning of Turkish flags in parts of Puntland, Jubaland and South West State reflected anger among some constituencies over allegations of Turkish involvement in domestic confrontations. Such protests do not represent nationwide opposition, but they contrast with the goodwill generated by Ankara’s humanitarian engagement in 2011. For supporters of stronger federal institutions, Turkey remains an important partner in security and reconstruction; for opponents of Hassan Sheikh’s constitutional and regional policies, its military relationship with Mogadishu increasingly raises questions about political neutrality. (Garowe Online, September 2026)
Ultimately, Turkey’s Somalia dilemma is not whether it should support the federal government, but whether that support strengthens a Somali state capable of outlasting Hassan Sheikh’s presidency—or becomes increasingly associated with the political and military power required to sustain it.
