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The South-West Crises: The Risk of Militarizing Political Disputes in Somalia

At a time when there are significant political disagreements between Somalia’s federal government and members states on electoral process and disputed constitution, the southwest crises have only escalated, given the government’s approach, further exacerbated by the actors involved. After eight years in office since 2018, President Abdiaziz Laftagreen has, in March 2026, secured his second term presidency through regional parliamentary vote, which the current federal government have rejected, terming it unconstitutional. After a short interim administration, former speaker of the federal government Sheikh Aden Madobe was hand-picked by the federal government, (se)elected as the Southwest President in June 2026, supported with military forces.

By The Somali Monitor·10/19/2026

Villa Baidoa

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On 30th March 2026, Somalia’s federal forces have entered Baidoa, securing the Presidential house, seizing security installations, government facilities and strategic position across the city of Baidoa. After military confrontations, the administration of Abdiaziz Laftagareen relinquished power, was forced out Baidoa and allowed to flee to Nairobi, Kenya after negotiations. Since then, while Abdiaziz had loyal elements within and the outskirts of Baidoa, forces loyal to Abdiaziz Laftagreen regrouped rearming with their clan militia, and other forces, reportedly from other member states. On 30th May 2026, the forces loyal to Abdiaziz have reportedly executed their first reaction, launching an attack, in Baidoa capturing parts of the city, before repelled by forces aligned to the federal government of Somalia. With amore intense fighting, a larger offensive military operation followed on 17 August 2026, when fighters aligned to Abdiaziz Laftagreen attacked Baidoa, holding key positions for a short- period, before withdrawing from the city. These confrontations demonstrated that the federal takeover had not resolved the underlying political and security dispute over Southwest state’s leadership.    

Beneath every development in Southwest state lie the central vulnerability in the country political order regarding the absence of broadly acceptable mechanisms for resolving disputes between the federal government and its constituent member states. While President Hassan and Abdiaziz Laftagareen have worked between 2022-2026, executed together key issues including the direct elections, the completion of the 2012 provisional constitution, reports indicate that President Hassan didn’t believe in the presidency of Abdiaziz Laftagreen, for his own medium and long-term political survival. The present escalation has evolved into armed contest over territorial control, political legitimacy and regional authority, in the mix of a geopolitical influence can establish durable political authority when significant local constituents continue to reject resulting leadership arrangements. Although the new administration, under Aden Madobe, acquired formal institutional authority from the federal government of Somalia, through what it called an election, the transition remained contested. Laftagareen and his allied forces and supporters continued to challenge its legitimacy, while the federal government continue to argue that political change was necessary as the new administration represented a lawful transition. The dispute therefore concerns not merely who occupies the regional presidency, but whether the process through which authority changed hands can command sufficient political and public acceptance.

The Territorial Reversals Expose the Limits of Military Control

The events of October 2026 demonstrate how rapidly territorial arrangements can change when military authority is not accompanied by stable local political agreements. Between 8 and 17 October, forces aligned with Laftagareen entered Qansaxdheere, Buurhakaba and Bardaale, with additional reported advances into Diinsoor and Awdiinle. Buurhakaba, strategically situated along the Baidoa–Mogadishu corridor, witnessed substantial fighting, whereas several other locations reportedly changed hands following withdrawals by federal-aligned personnel. An AFP report published on 18 October confirmed that forces loyal to the former president had captured several important towns, significantly reducing the territorial reach of the federally backed administration. Independent verification of the precise situation in every district remains incomplete.

These developments suggest that the military balance cannot be understood through troop deployments and equipment alone. Political relationships, clan mediation, local security networks and the willingness of district authorities to recognize competing administrations can be equally consequential. The withdrawal of forces from several towns without sustained confrontation raises questions about the depth of local commitment to the administration established after March. However, territorial gains by Laftagareen-aligned forces do not, by themselves, establish popular consent or settle the competing constitutional claims. They demonstrate that neither military control nor formal institutional recognition necessarily resolves underlying disputes over political legitimacy.

The Risks of Using Counterterrorism Measures and Militarization  in a Political Dispute

A particularly consequential development occurred on 13 October 2026, when Somalia’s National Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Committee placed Laftagareen and nine other individuals on a national financial sanctions list over alleged links to Al-Shabaab. The designation requires relevant financial institutions to freeze assets and restrict transactions involving the named individuals. The committee stated that its decision followed an assessment of information concerning suspected support for the armed group, but its publicly available announcement did not provide individualized evidence explaining the allegations against each designated person.

The distinction between a political rival, an armed opponent and an individual credibly implicated in terrorist financing is legally and institutionally significant. Somalia has legitimate obligations to investigate and disrupt Al-Shabaab’s financial networks, and holding political office cannot exempt anyone from those obligations. Nevertheless, when counterterrorism sanctions are imposed amid an unresolved political confrontation, transparency, evidentiary standards and meaningful opportunities for review become particularly important. Without such safeguards, the measures may be perceived as instruments of political exclusion, irrespective of the underlying intelligence. The broader institutional risk is that counterterrorism mechanisms could lose public confidence if their application appears inseparable from competition over political authority.

The South West crisis also raises a constitutional question extending beyond the political fortunes of Laftagareen or Aden Madobe. Article 50 of Somalia’s 2012 Provisional Constitution establishes principles requiring cooperation, mutual support and public confidence across levels of government. These principles do not grant regional presidents immunity from political accountability, nor do they prevent lawful federal intervention where national security is genuinely threatened. They do, however, establish an important distinction between the exercise of federal authority and the replacement of political negotiation with coercive measures. The disputed 2024 constitutional amendments and subsequent disagreements over electoral arrangements have made this distinction increasingly contentious. The constitutional question is whether federal intervention in South West State respected the applicable legal procedures and the division of powers between Mogadishu and the member states.

The wider implications concern Somalia’s evolving federal settlement. Puntland and Jubbaland have already challenged aspects of the federal government’s constitutional and political direction, although their institutional histories and specific grievances differ from those of South West State. The South West confrontation adds a further dimension: a disputed transition has developed into a contest involving armed forces, territorial control and competing claims to regional authority. The danger for Somalia’s federal project is not simply that political leaders disagree, but that disputes over leadership increasingly become tests of military strength rather than questions resolved through legitimate and predictable institutions.

External Security Partnerships, Humanitarian consequences and the Risk of a Wider Conflict

The presence of Ethiopian forces operating within the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) adds another dimension to the confrontation. AFP reported on 18 October that Ethiopian troops remained inside their base as Laftagareen-aligned forces entered Bardaale, while separate reports indicate that Ethiopia has resisted requests to intervene on behalf of either political camp. Those reported requests have not been independently confirmed through an official Ethiopian statement. Nevertheless, the episode illustrates the practical distinction between international assistance directed at counterterrorism and the use of external forces to settle internal political disputes.

That distinction matters because Somalia’s security partnerships are already embedded in a complicated regional environment. If the confrontation in South West State becomes entangled with competing external interests, it could further complicate the relationship between federal institutions, regional administrations and international security partners. Conversely, foreign forces declining to participate in a domestic political contest does not necessarily imply opposition to the Federal Government. Their conduct must be assessed against their mandates and the applicable command arrangements, rather than interpreted solely through Somalia’s internal political divisions.

The consequences of further escalation would extend well beyond the competing political administrations. Baidoa and the surrounding districts have long hosted substantial displaced populations and communities dependent on humanitarian assistance. During the August 2026 fighting in Baidoa, Reuters documented civilian casualties and reported severe malnutrition among children in displacement settlements. Renewed confrontation threatens to disrupt humanitarian access, commercial transport, livelihoods and essential services, particularly along the roads connecting Baidoa with surrounding districts. In a region already confronting displacement, poverty and Al-Shabaab activity, an additional armed political conflict creates overlapping risks for civilians.

The counterterrorism implications are equally significant. Al-Shabaab remains an active armed threat, and sustained confrontation between federal and regional-aligned forces could divert personnel, intelligence resources and political attention from operations against the insurgency. However, the possibility that Al-Shabaab may exploit divisions does not establish that either political camp is collaborating with it. Maintaining that distinction is essential both to the credibility of counterterrorism efforts and to preventing political allegations from substituting for independently assessed evidence.

What the South West Crisis Reveals About Somalia’s Political Order

The South West confrontation demonstrates the limits of defining state-building principally through the control of administrative capitals, the appointment of political leaders or the deployment of security forces. Such measures can establish an immediate governing presence, but they do not necessarily create the political relationships through which authority becomes accepted and sustainable. The rapid changes in territorial control during October suggest that local legitimacy, negotiated arrangements and security-force cohesion remain central to the functioning of federal institutions. At the same time, the use of armed force by Laftagareen-aligned groups carries its own responsibilities and risks, including civilian protection and the possibility of prolonging the dispute.

The crisis also exposes a broader institutional dilemma: Somalia’s political system continues to depend heavily on negotiations among political elites, yet those negotiations often lack trusted mechanisms for enforcement and dispute resolution. When relationships deteriorate, competing actors may turn to armed mobilization, financial restrictions, rival administrative structures or external alliances. Each of these instruments can strengthen an actor's immediate bargaining position while making a negotiated settlement more difficult. The absence of credible arbitration mechanisms therefore remains a significant weakness in Somalia’s federal architecture.

An alternative approach would require separating the legal questions surrounding the March transition from the immediate security imperatives. Independent examination of the disputed transfer of authority, transparent review of financial sanctions, protection of civilians and negotiations involving relevant political actors, traditional authorities and regional institutions could provide a framework for de-escalation. Such a process would not require accepting Laftagareen’s claim to office or dismissing the authority of the Aden Madobe administration in advance. Its purpose would be to establish a credible means of addressing the competing claims without further militarizing the political dispute.

Ultimately, the significance of South West State extends beyond the future of one former president or the survival of one regional administration. It concerns whether Somalia can develop a federal political order in which leadership disputes are settled through constitutional procedures, accountable institutions and negotiated political arrangements rather than recurring armed confrontations. The central lesson is that territorial control and political legitimacy are not interchangeable: neither federal military intervention nor armed resistance can, on its own, establish a durable constitutional settlement. Without an accepted process for resolving the underlying dispute, the immediate struggle over Baidoa risks becoming another episode in Somalia’s longer cycle of contested authority, insecurity and interrupted state-building.

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