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The Somali Monitor

Somalia’s Counterterrorism Communication Strategy: Building Public Trust

Somalia is trying to win the information war against Al-Shabaab, but the contest may be decided less by what the government says than by what it delivers.

By The Somali Monitor·10/11/2026

SONNA

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Since 2022, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), under the leadership of HE President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Prime Minister Dr. Hamza Abdi, has passed key legislations to fight terrorism beyond the conventional traditional military operations, These included the 2023 National Intelligence and Security Agency Act; the Targeted Financial Sanctions Act and the Anti-Terrorism Law all passed by the House of the Somali legislature and signed into law by March 2023. As a result, Mogadishu, under President Hassan Sheikh and Prime Minister Hamza, has witnessed important security reforms, including expanded CCTV surveillance, strengthened intelligence and military operations, improved community awareness and financial measures targeting millions of dollars in Al-Shabaab linked revenue and its capacity to disrupt extremist operations. The UK government’s July 2025 assessment described Mogadishu as relatively stable, mainly reflecting this with the emerging improved security in the capital Mogadishu as compared by contrast to the past years before the current administration came to power in 2022.    

Collectively while these laws established a stronger legal and institutional framework for intelligence operations, disrupting insecurity incidents, terrorist financing and investigating and prosecuting terrorism-related offences; Somalia’s messaging and strategic communications has not yet been clear and mature enough. Therefore, Somalia’s expanding cooperation with international partners on strategic communication reflects an important shift in counterterrorism thinking and against the propaganda of the current Al-Shabaab militants. And yet, its effectiveness will depend on whether public messaging and information is supported by credible governance, federal cooperation and independent media, public confidence in state institutions and the everyday security experiences of the Somali communities in the country.

Against this backdrop, Somalia’s ongoing efforts to strengthen the non-military dimensions of counterterrorism, particularly through strategic communications, public awareness and countering extremist propaganda, reflect the growing importance of information in building public trust and challenging Al-Shabaab’s ideological influence and propaganda. Yet the central question extends beyond whether the Federal Government of Somalia can counter Al-Shabaab’s narratives and disinformation effectively. Rather, it is whether the government’s expanding legal, institutional and communication initiatives can translate military and non-military gains into credible governance, sustained community cooperation and lasting public confidence in the Somali state

Somalia’s Communication and Information Strategy Against Al Shabaab Propaganda

Somalia’s evolving counterterrorism strategy is increasingly drawing attention to the importance of strategic communications, public confidence and institutional legitimacy in confronting Al-Shabaab, a dimension highlighted by discussions in Mogadishu on 10 October 2026 between the Minister of Information, Culture and Tourism, Hon. Abdulfatah Kasim Mohamud (also rendered Abdifatah Qasim Mohamud), and U.S. East Africa Counterterrorism Program Adviser Robert Flannery. According to the Somali National News Agency (SONNA), the meeting centred on strengthening Somalia–U.S. cooperation in counterterrorism, public awareness, countering extremist propaganda and ideologies, and coordinating government messaging, with the minister emphasising a unified media strategy to ensure the public receives accurate information and Flannery underscoring the value of continued collaboration in media and strategic communications (SONNA, 10 October 2026). Beyond its technical dimensions, the engagement raises a broader institutional question: whether Somalia can translate military operations and expanding security partnerships into credible public communication, sustained community confidence and more accountable governance. This significance becomes clearer against Somalia’s prolonged experience of military offensives, territorial recovery and recurring insecurity. Al-Shabaab’s influence is not sustained exclusively through armed violence; the organisation also employs sophisticated propaganda, intimidation and political messaging to challenge government authority, exploit public grievances and shape perceptions of security and legitimacy. Analyses by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point document Al-Shabaab’s coherent communications architecture—centred on Al-Kataib Media Foundation, radio outlets, websites and adaptive social-media networks across Telegram, Facebook, TikTok and other platforms—that delivers timely, multi-language content designed to control narratives and reinforce the group’s claims of veracity (Combating Terrorism Centre West Point, 2024). Complementary assessments from Sahan Global and related research confirm that Al-Shabaab ranks among the most prolific producers of terrorist material online, blending nationalist themes, humanising commander interviews and anti-foreign messaging to undermine the federal government while presenting itself as a defender of Somali interests (Sahan Global, 2025; ResearchGate analyses of media strategy 2006–2025). Consequently, the struggle extends beyond territorial control to the question of whether communities regard state institutions as reliable sources of protection, justice and public information. This distinction is essential because military achievements and political legitimacy do not necessarily advance together. Government forces may recover territory without immediately establishing functioning civilian administration, while communities emerging from Al-Shabaab control often remain exposed to insecurity, retaliation, unresolved disputes and limited public services. International Crisis Group reporting shows that the substantial territorial gains of 2022–2023 in central Somalia were largely reversed by Al-Shabaab in 2025, producing a renewed stalemate in which the group has adapted by improving relations with local populations beyond pure coercion (International Crisis Group, 2026). Parallel analyses from The New Humanitarian and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies highlight Al-Shabaab’s parallel governance structures—efficient tax collection, courts and dispute resolution—in significant areas of south-central Somalia, which many residents view as more predictable, if brutal, than federal alternatives plagued by corruption and service gaps; “liberated” zones frequently see militants reassert influence once garrisons depart, leaving official declarations of success carrying less weight than everyday experiences of insecurity and weak administration (The New Humanitarian, 2025; Africa Center, 2025). Under such circumstances, strategic communications cannot be treated merely as a mechanism for promoting military achievements; their credibility depends on whether the state can demonstrate meaningful improvements in the areas it claims to govern.

From Bilateral Engagement to a Broader National Security Framework, by the MoICT, Somalia

The latest U.S. engagement should also be understood as part of an emerging institutional pattern rather than an isolated diplomatic meeting. Somalia has pursued cooperation on strategic communications with several international partners, reflecting growing recognition that public information, media development and counter-extremism are interconnected. In September 2026, the Ministry of Information convened the Second Somali Strategic Communication Forum (7–8 September) under the theme “Shaping the Future of Somalia’s Media in the Digital Era.” The two-day event brought together federal institutions, Federal Member States, the Banadir Regional Administration, media professionals and organisations, civil society, academia, social-media influencers and international partners. Discussions focused on modernising the media sector, strengthening government communications, promoting access to credible public information, countering misinformation and disinformation, adapting to digital technologies and artificial intelligence, reinforcing media ethics, and building professional capacity; a dedicated inter-ministerial session examined coordination of government messaging and implementation of the National Communication Strategy across levels of government (Ministry of Information press release, 8 September 2026; Goobjoog News and Arlaadi Media reporting). This institutional direction is consistent with Somalia’s existing counterterrorism framework. During its February 2025 assessment visit, the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (via CTED) explicitly identified six components of the country’s national strategy: military/liberation operations, urban security, countering the financing of terrorism, preventing/countering violent extremism, strategic communications, and stabilisation. The Committee commended Somalia’s multi-pronged approach, noting that the inclusion of strategic communications alongside kinetic, financial and preventive pillars recognises that counterterrorism requires more than the destruction of armed capabilities; it also demands weakening extremist financing, preventing recruitment, strengthening civilian security and creating conditions under which government authority can be sustained (UN CTC/CTED assessment, February 2025). Strategic communications are therefore not a substitute for these other measures, but a means of connecting them to public understanding and participation—an analytical linkage that the September forum and subsequent bilateral engagements explicitly sought to operationalise. Somalia’s expanding international partnerships reinforce this approach. In September 2026, Minister Abdulfatah Kasim Mohamud engaged Turkish communications officials, including Deniz Demir (Coordinator of the Centre for Combating Disinformation at the Presidency’s Directorate of Communications), both bilaterally and at a high-level forum on Türkiye–Somalia relations. He proposed elevating counter-disinformation and strategic communication into a structured pillar of the bilateral partnership, encompassing capacity-building, professional exchanges, joint analysis of emerging trends, monitoring, crisis communication, countering extremist narratives, public diplomacy and rapid coordination mechanisms (SONNA, Ministry of Information statements, and DISA/Goobjoog reporting, 10–13 September 2026). Separately, on 20 September 2026, discussions with the UNDP Resident Representative addressed media capacity development, public awareness, countering misinformation and disinformation, preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE), and culture/tourism promotion, with both sides emphasising the need to translate technical engagement into concrete programmes under a clear implementation framework and regular coordination mechanism (Ministry of Information/SONNA, 20 September 2026). These developments indicate a deliberate effort to institutionalise communication capacities. However, the available announcements establish discussions, proposals and intended cooperation rather than demonstrating that all the envisaged programmes have been fully implemented or independently evaluated for impact. Analytically, the involvement of multiple international partners presents both opportunities and governance challenges. Technical assistance from the United States, Türkiye, UNDP and others can improve research, information verification, institutional coordination and the professional capacity of Somali media institutions—areas repeatedly identified as critical given Al-Shabaab’s sophisticated propaganda apparatus. Yet parallel partnerships risk producing fragmented, donor-driven programmes unless they operate within a nationally owned and coordinated framework. The critical issue is whether Somalia can convert external support into sustainable domestic institutions rather than remaining dependent on separate partner-supported initiatives. This requires clarity over institutional mandates (particularly the Ministry of Information’s coordinating role and the National Committee for Government Communication Coordination), accountability mechanisms, implementation responsibilities, and a clear distinction between public-interest communication that builds legitimacy and narrower political messaging. Without such clarity, the emerging pattern of forums and bilateral engagements risks remaining declaratory rather than transformative leaving the gap between military operations and public confidence only partially bridged.

Public Trust, Federalism and the Credibility of State Authority

The most important test of this emerging strategy lies in its relationship with Somalia’s wider state-building process. Al-Shabaab’s continued influence demonstrates the limitations of treating insecurity exclusively as a military problem. In territories affected by prolonged conflict, communities judge political authority through their experiences of protection, dispute resolution, public administration and access to services. Independent analyses consistently show that Al-Shabaab has cultivated a degree of practical legitimacy by operating relatively predictable taxation systems, swift and less-corrupt courts, and mechanisms for resolving land, commercial and clan disputes—functions that many residents, even in government-held areas, sometimes prefer to slower or more patronage-driven federal alternatives (The New Humanitarian, 2025; International Crisis Group reporting; Hiraal Institute and Saferworld assessments). Where these state functions remain weak, official messaging struggles to overcome public distrust, regardless of how professionally it is crafted. The United Nations-supported stabilization framework similarly recognizes that extending state authority depends on the presence, capacity and legitimacy of Somali institutions, alongside locally responsive reconciliation and governance arrangements. UNSOM’s Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A) programme, which supports the National Stabilization Strategy, explicitly anchors its work in four pillars—community recovery, social cohesion, local governance and rule of law—and states that “the extension of state authority is predicated on components such as the presence, capacity and legitimacy of the Somali institutions” (UNSOM CRESTA/A documentation). This institutional logic underscores that communication cannot substitute for tangible governance performance. This relationship between governance and communication is especially consequential in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. Government information campaigns may encourage communities to cooperate with security institutions, reject extremist recruitment or participate in stabilization initiatives. However, these messages become more persuasive when accompanied by functioning local administrations, accountable security personnel and mechanisms through which civilians can report abuses and seek redress. Conversely, where government institutions fail to meet public expectations—leaving security vacuums, unresolved disputes or predatory behaviour—extremist propaganda readily exploits the gap between official promises and lived realities. The strategic objective must therefore extend beyond changing public perceptions to addressing the structural conditions that shape those perceptions. Somalia’s federal political environment introduces another important consideration. Although counterterrorism is a shared national priority, the federal government and Federal Member States continue to disagree over constitutional authority, security governance, electoral processes and intergovernmental relations. Recent disputes—particularly involving Puntland and Jubaland over constitutional amendments, power-sharing and the National Security Architecture—have complicated the development of a common national narrative (Hiiraan Online analyses, 2026; Rift Valley Institute assessments of federalism and the National Security Architecture; NE Global Media reporting on deepening fault lines). Where communities place greater confidence in regional or local institutions than in federal authorities, a centrally directed communication strategy risks being perceived as advancing Mogadishu’s political position rather than addressing a genuinely shared security concern. Fragmentation of security partnerships and parallel authority structures further erodes the credibility of any single national message. The participation of Federal Member State representatives in the September 2026 Strategic Communication Forum provides a relevant institutional foundation. According to the Ministry of Information, participants discussed improving coordination across government communications and advancing the National Communication Strategy, including inter-ministerial sessions aimed at coherent messaging (Ministry of Information press release, 8 September 2026). Yet consultation alone does not resolve questions concerning who determines communication priorities, how competing institutional perspectives are accommodated, or whether regional authorities have meaningful responsibilities and resources in implementation. An effective national framework would need to recognize legitimate differences while maintaining common standards for verified security information, civilian protection and public accountability—otherwise the strategy risks remaining aspirational rather than operational.

Equally important is the role of independent media and civil society. Countering extremist propaganda requires credible information, but credibility cannot be established solely through government control over public narratives. Independent journalists, religious leaders, community organizations and local institutions can reach audiences that may distrust official communication and contribute to accountability by documenting civilian experiences and identifying shortcomings in security and governance. The United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2016) and subsequent Somalia-specific frameworks explicitly link strategic communications with community engagement, good governance, human rights, education and opportunities for young people (UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action; UNSOM PCVE mandate; TUBSAN National Center pillars). This reinforces the argument that credible counterterrorism communication must be embedded within broader social and institutional reforms rather than treated as a standalone messaging exercise.

Finally, the distinction between extremist propaganda and legitimate political criticism is particularly important. False information, incitement and recruitment messaging present genuine security concerns, but disagreement with government policies, independent reporting on military operations and criticism of public institutions should not automatically be categorized as disinformation. Conflating these categories risks undermining media independence and weakening public confidence in the very institutions the strategy seeks to strengthen. Somalia’s communication strategy would therefore benefit from transparent, publicly articulated standards for identifying harmful information, correcting inaccurate official statements, and protecting lawful public debate—standards that themselves become a test of institutional legitimacy.

Conclusion

The reported meeting between Minister Abdulfatah Kasim Mohamud and U.S. adviser Robert Flannery, together with parallel engagements with Türkiye and UNDP and the September 2026 Strategic Communication Forum, underscores a critical institutional insight: Somalia’s counterterrorism challenge cannot be won on the battlefield alone. A coherent, credible communication strategy is not a peripheral public-relations exercise; it is a strategic necessity. Without it, military gains remain fragile, public cooperation stays limited, and the state struggles to convert territorial recovery into lasting authority. Strategic communications matter because they shape how communities interpret security operations, judge the reliability of government institutions, and decide whether to withhold support from Al-Shabaab or actively assist state forces. In an environment where information travels faster than troops, the ability to provide timely, accurate and trusted information becomes a core instrument of state power.

Narratives and propaganda give Al-Shabaab a decisive edge precisely because the group understands this reality. Its sophisticated media architecture—centred on Al-Kataib productions, radio broadcasts, multi-language social-media networks and consistent messaging across platforms—allows it to frame government forces as foreign-backed, corrupt or indifferent to local grievances, while presenting itself as a provider of order, swift justice and predictable administration (CTC West Point analyses; Sahan Global reporting). Even when its rule is brutal, Al-Shabaab’s communication often appears more coherent and responsive to everyday concerns than official statements that celebrate territorial gains without addressing insecurity, unresolved disputes or service gaps. This narrative advantage enables the group to sustain recruitment, intimidate communities, exploit political fragmentation and reassert influence in areas from which it has been temporarily displaced. Counter-messaging that merely denounces Al-Shabaab without demonstrating tangible improvements in protection, justice and governance therefore struggles to compete.

For the government, preparing an effective communication strategy requires more than technical upgrades in media capacity or social-media monitoring. It demands three interlocking commitments. First, communication must be grounded in verified facts and rapid correction of official errors; credibility collapses when public statements diverge from lived experience. Second, it must be developed cooperatively across federal institutions, Federal Member States, independent media and community actors, so that messaging reflects shared security priorities rather than appearing as a Mogadishu-centric political instrument. Third, and most importantly, communication must be deliberately linked to institutional performance: every claim of improved security or governance must be accompanied by visible, accountable delivery of protection, dispute resolution and basic services. Only then can official narratives begin to close the gap that Al-Shabaab’s propaganda exploits.

Ultimately, the decisive test is not whether the Somali government can craft a more polished narrative than Al-Shabaab, but whether it can build the security, governance and public trust that make its narrative credible. Strategic communications can amplify military gains and support stabilization, yet their lasting value depends on the state’s capacity to translate those gains into institutions that communities recognize as legitimate, responsive and capable of protecting them. In short, the path from controlling narratives to building credible institutions runs through consistent performance: when the state reliably provides order and justice, its communication becomes persuasive; when it does not, even the most sophisticated information campaign will fail to close the legitimacy gap that sustains the insurgency.