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Independent News, Analysis & Policy Briefing on Somalia and the Horn of Africa

The Somali Monitor

President Hassan Sheikh’s Foreign Policy Rethink: Navigating Regional Geopolitics

As shifting geopolitics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea redraw regional alliances, Somalia is cautiously moving from reactive diplomacy toward strategic autonomy, balancing competing partnerships with Egypt, Ethiopia, Türkiye, and the Gulf while navigating persistent domestic fragmentation and institutional challenges.

By The Somali Monitor·10/10/2026
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Somalia’s foreign policy has long been shaped by tendencies of external interferences, dependences, political band-wagoning, coercive diplomacy and efforts to accommodate, negotiate with, or leverage such interests of powerful regional and global actors (Almi, 2021, pp.373-375; Hagmann, 2016). These patterns reflect Somalia’s constrained strategic and diplomatic choices, due to institutional and state weaknesses, external aid dependence, insecurity, coupled with competing domestic interests and minimum political cohesion among the wider Somali political groups, leadership and elites. More importantly to note, however, Somali political class, as legitimate, yet potentially disruptive actors, have also actively mobilized and redirected external influences, leverages and resources to advance their own political agendas, rather than simply responding passively to foreign influence (Hagmann, 2016; Jaspars, Majid and Adan, 2023, Guven, 2026). While the political calculations of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud remain part of these wider equations and interactions between domestic and external partnerships, the rapidly shifting geopolitics of the Horn suggest that something more consequential is beginning to emerge, far different from what Somalia’s foreign policy used to be. As this raises the question of weather Somalia can translate a wider range of partnerships into greater strategic room for manoeuvre (Guven 2026), Somalia appears to be moving, however cautiously, from a largely reactive foreign policy towards greater strategic autonomy—balancing competing partnerships, navigating regional rivalries and seeking to define its national interests without becoming overly aligned with any single regional power. Arguably, this remains an emerging possibility rather than an established transformation of Somalia foreign policy. A recent scholarship in 2026, argues that domestic fragmentation and continuing security dependence have so far produced asymmetric external balancing rather than institutionalized foreign policy autonomy (Guven 2026)

What is changing today is the geopolitical environment surrounding Somalia’s state-building project as security dynamics in the Horn becomes increasingly intertwined with competition across the Red Sea and the wider Middle East (Verhoeven, 2018; Donelli and Gonzalez-Levaggi,2021). Despite the complexity this comes with, Somalia’s strategic environment extends well beyond the security calculations of Kenya and Ethiopia; it increasingly finds itself at the intersection of a wider geo-political contest involving Egypt, Türkiye, the Gulf states and other actors with growing interests in the Horn and Red Sea (Donelli and Cannon,2019; Donelli and Gonzalez-Levaggi, 2021).  Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access (Bereketeab, 2024), Egypt’s strategic concerns over Ethiopia and Red Sea security, Türkiye’s expanding political, economic and security role, and Gulf investment in ports and infrastructure are collectively increasing Somalia’s geopolitical importance, further exacerbating consequential arena of regional and geopolitical competition.

In a very fluid regional and global dynamics, Somalia’s wider changing environment presents both opportunity and risk for Somali state-building trajectory (Melvin, 2019, pp.10-12) With balanced relationship with neighbouring countries and a coherent national approach, greater competition among external powers, could enable Mogadishu to diversify its partnerships, attract investment and security assistance, reduce excessive dependence on any single actor and strengthen Somalia’s diplomatic bargaining power (Ylonen, 2023; Melvin, 2019, pp. 10-12). Managed strategically, these relationships could provide Somalia with greater space to pursue its own national interests, although the exercise of local agency does not necessarily translate into stronger state institution or broadly shared national benefits (Ylonen, 2023). Likewise, its fair to link this with the fact that Mogadishu’s current foreign-policy approach and engagement with different countries remain highly contested by Federal Member States, particularly Puntland and Jubbaland, as well as prominent opposition leaders. 

The central question, therefore, is whether Somalia can convert its growing geopolitical importance into leverage for state-building rather than renewed external dependence, while limiting the risk that its partnerships intensify domestic fragmentation or regional hostility (Ylönen, 2023; Melvin, 2019, pp. 10–12).

The Historical Costs of Somalia’s Political Band-wagoning- and the Erosion of Political Autonomy 

Historically, the possible consequences of such external dependence have not always remained abstract. Contemporary reporting records allegations that neighbouring government’s preferences influenced Somalia’s foreign-policy decisions. A revealing example emerged from the Farmaajo administration between 2017-2022. In an interview conducted on January 2022, former Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdirizak alleged that Villa Somalia had instructed him to prevent an Egyptian C-130 carrying Arab League COVID-19 medical assistance from landing in Mogadishu and to request instead that the supplies be delivered on another aircraft. According to Abdirizak, when he sought an explanation, he was told that Ethiopia objected to the Egyptian military aircraft. He further alleged that Addis Ababa had opposed the training of Somali forces in Egypt, the allocation of land for a new Egyptian embassy and the operation of an Egyptian school in Somalia (Hiiraan Online, 2022; Somali Guardian, 2022). These claims remain Abdirizak’s testimony rather than facts independently established through publicly available Somali or Ethiopian government records.

Equally, Kenya provides an important case as well. The maritime dispute between Somalia and Kenya exposed what could happen when the expectation of a country that is potentially more stable, powerful than your country, is challenged. After unsuccessful negotiations between the two countries, Somalia took Kenya to the Hague on 28 August 2014 and have since insisted on pursuing the ICJ case. Against Kenya’s preference for bilateral negotiations, the disagreement spilled into a wider diplomatic confrontation and have tried to influence the dynamics of Somalia’s internal and external political spectrum. This year 2026, former NISA Director Fahad Yasin, spoke with Geed-Fadhi podcast, giving a more striking account of what the political pressure looks-like in the midst of the Kenya-Somalia maritime dispute at the time. In a meeting with the then Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, Fahad Yassin recalled that the Kenyan President personally demanded Somalia to withdraw the maritime case and threatened an intervention. During this exceptionally heated meeting, Fahad claims that Uhuru Kenyata overturned the table between them before later apologising. Yasin further linked Somalia’s refusal to the subsequent deterioration in diplomatic relations. These dramatic details remain his uncorroborated testimony, but the wider dispute and diplomatic rupture are established.

Read alongside former Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdirizak’s previously discussed account of Ethiopian pressure over Somalia’s engagement with Egypt, former intelligence chief Fahad Yasin’s account suggests a contrasting way in which relations with powerful neighbours could constrain Somali decision-making. In a retrospective interview reported in May 2026, Yasin portrayed Kenya’s leadership as seeking a political accommodation over the maritime dispute and alleged that Somalia’s refusal generated pressure and hostility (Siyad Reports, 2026). Taken as attributed testimony rather than independently verified findings, the accounts suggest two possible constraints on strategic autonomy: accommodating a powerful neighbour may restrict engagement with other partners, while resisting another neighbour’s demands may incur diplomatic costs. Their significance lies partly in the officials’ proximity to decision-making, but their senior positions do not remove the need to assess their retrospective narratives critically; the reporting itself notes the possibility of selective recollection and political rehabilitation (Siyad Reports, 2026). These accounts therefore support an inquiry into the limits of Somalia’s strategic room for manoeuvre, rather than conclusively demonstrating that “band-wagoning” caused the pressures described

That historical experience makes Somalia’s changing external relationships particularly consequential. In January 2025, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to restore and enhance bilateral relations through full diplomatic representation, while Somalia and Egypt formally elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership later that month (Ethiopian News Agency, 2025; Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2025). The objective should not be to exchange dependence on one partner for dependence on another. Nor need strategic autonomy require equal distance from competing powers. Scholarship on hedging instead emphasizes preserving options, avoiding exclusive commitments and maintaining fallback relationships under conditions of uncertainty, while recognizing that this approach entails risks and does not guarantee freedom from external pressure (Kuik, 2021). Applied to Somalia, strategic autonomy can therefore be understood as the capacity to cooperate with different partners on different interests while retaining meaningful control over diplomatic choices. The emerging test is not simply whom Mogadishu partners with, but whether it can increasingly determine the purposes, limits and terms of those partnerships

THE CONTEXTUAL COMPLEXITY OF THE CURRENT EGYPT -ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA CASE

Perhaps partly influenced by the unfolding situations in the middle east, the evolving relationship between Somalia, Egypt and Ethiopia have intensified. More than any other time in the recent history, the present inter-state strategic relations keep reflecting the intersection of competing nation’s national interests and regional geopolitical rivalries (Darwisheh, 2026). As history has been, Egypt’s priorities have always been the Nile water security and containing Ethiopia’s regional influence and Red Sea security, while Ethiopia seeks maritime access through the Red Sea, economic security and greater strategic influence in the Horn of Africa (Fenton-Harvey, 2026). Somalia, meanwhile, seeks to protect its sovereignty as with the case of Somaliland seeking the second country recognize her, after Israel’s acknowledgement in Dec 2025- and in addition to strengthening Somali’s national security, cooperation and external partnerships. Although these interests are not inherently irreconcilable, their intersection creates competing expectations (Darwisheh, 2026). What Mogadishu considers security diversification may appear as strategic encirclement to Addis Ababa, while Somalia’s accommodation of Ethiopian maritime access may raise concerns in Cairo, particularly if it enhances Ethiopia’s strategic or naval position (Reuters, 2024; Fenton-Harvey,2026). Somalia’s challenge is therefore to pursue its national interests without allowing either country’s rivalry to define its foreign policy. 

Following the increasing closer Somalia-Egypt alignment that emerged after the January 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding; Somalia’s current approach suggests a shift towards more flexible diplomatic engagement approach, with all its shortcomings and pressures ((Reuters, 2024; Ethiopian News Agency 2024)). However, in part, the December 2024 Ankara declaration, brokered by Turkey, opened a pathway to renewed cooperation with Ethiopia and commercial maritime access under Somalia’s sovereignty. Alongside this rapprochement, Somalia has also elevated her relationship with Egypt to a strategic partnership in January 2025, explicitly reaffirming continued Egyptian military support to address the country security threats. Given the different competing interest, this approach of dealing with both Egypt and Ethiopia, may not fully satisfy either country’s expectations or ambitions, as each relationship is equally important for Somalia. Cairo may prefer a Somalia that constrains Ethiopian influence, while Addis Ababa may seek to limit Egypt’s military presence in Somalia and the Horn. Somalia’s balancing has therefore become more than diplomatic choreography. Somalia’s approach can therefore be interpreted as an effort to preserve cooperation with both partners without fully aligning with either country’s regional agenda. However, the longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), together with disagreements over maritime access and regional military influence, creates a risk that Somalia’s bilateral partnerships become entangled in the wider Egypt–Ethiopia rivalry (Reuters, 2024b; Holleis, 2026).

Nevertheless, Somalia’s strategic flexibility remains constrained by domestic political divisions, institutional weaknesses and continued dependence on external security assistance. Disagreements between Mogadishu, Puntland, Jubbaland and other political actors complicate the development of a coherent national foreign policy and create opportunities for competing external influence. Somalia consequently occupies an increasingly important but precarious geopolitical position. Its strategic geography strengthens its diplomatic relevance, yet internal fragmentation limits its ability to translate that importance into leverage. The distinction between diversifying partnerships and achieving strategic autonomy is therefore critical: the former expands diplomatic options, while the latter requires the institutional capacity and political consensus to manage them independently.

Ultimately, the question is no longer whether Egypt or Ethiopia is the more useful partner, whether Somalia should remain equally distant from both nations, and even create more hostility with one of them. Rather, it is whether Mogadishu can cooperate with each while preventing their disputes over the GERD, Red Sea access and regional security from becoming Somalia’s own disputes. Unlike earlier periods of more exclusive geopolitical alignment, the current approach suggests an attempt to pursue differentiated partnerships without permanent allegiance to either side. The emerging test of Somalia’s strategic autonomy is whether it can translate its growing geopolitical importance into national leverage without allowing the rivalries that make it important to determine its foreign policy, undermine its sovereignty or complicate its state-building ambitions.

Egypt’s Importance to Somalia and the Threat of Ethiopian Maritime Ambitions

Egypt’s strategic importance to Somalia extends beyond its rivalry with Ethiopia. Somalia’s key interest fundamentally rests on its need to safeguard territorial integrity, diversify security partnerships and strengthen its regional negotiating position. Ethiopia’s 1 January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland demonstrated how Addis Ababa’s maritime ambitions could challenge Somalia’s sovereignty by negotiating directly with an authority (Somaliland) Mogadishu does not recognize as an independent state. Against this backdrop, Egypt offers Somalia a significant diplomatic and security partnership within the wider Arab league nations, reinforced by the August 2024 military cooperation agreement and January 2025 strategic partnership. Egyptian military assistance, training, intelligence cooperation and planned participation in AUSSOM provide opportunities to strengthen Somalia’s security capabilities while reducing excessive dependence on Ethiopia. According to African Union’s approved troops allocations and under the AU Peace and Security Council ‘s May 2025 arrangement; Egypt was allocated to contribute 1,091 troops, alongside Ethiopia’s 2,500-armed forces to Somalia. Against this backdrop, Egypt emerged as an important diplomatic and security partner, with cooperation formalised through the military protocol signed on 14 August 2024 and the strategic-partnership declaration of 23 January 2025 (Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2025). Egyptian arms deliveries, commitments to military training and counterterrorism information-sharing, and its announced participation in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) offered additional support for Somalia’s security institutions (Reuters, 2024a, 2024b; Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2025). All together, these arrangements can be interpreted as opportunities to diversify Somalia’s security partnerships, although they do not in themselves demonstrate reduced dependence on Ethiopia. Cairo’s repeated support for Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity also provides Mogadishu with diplomatic backing in disputes over Somaliland and maritime access (Reuters, 2024b; Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2025).

The greater strategic concern, however, lies in the possibility that Ethiopia’s pursuit of Red Sea access could extend beyond commercial necessity towards military control, coercive diplomacy or unilateral territorial arrangements (Reuters, 2024a; Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 2025). Ethiopian rhetoric portraying maritime access as a strategic necessity, including references to the possible use of force, has heightened regional concerns, although this does not establish an imminent threat of military action against Somalia. The Somaliland memorandum nevertheless demonstrated Addis Ababa’s willingness to pursue maritime arrangements without Mogadishu’s consent, raising legitimate concerns about future attempts to establish naval facilities, exclusive security arrangements or territorial footholds along Somalia’s coastline (Reuters, 2024a, 2024b). In this context, as Somalia’ favourable partner, Egypt represents a more than a diplomatic counterweight: its military capabilities, strategic interests in the Red Sea and opposition to unilateral changes in regional territorial arrangements offer Somalia additional diplomatic leverage and security cooperation (Reuters, 2024c; Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2025; Holleis, 2026). Somalia’s strategic interest, therefore, is not to align with Egypt against Ethiopia, but to maintain a credible partnership capable of strengthening its sovereignty, deterring coercive interference and ensuring that any Ethiopian maritime access remains subject to Somalia’s consent, jurisdiction and national interests.

The Logic of Somalia’s Ethiopia Policy- And Its Limits 

The current emerging world order appears increasingly defined by the pursuit of potential hegemony, where national interests and strategic ambitions often outweigh shared principles and international commitments.   Despite the prevailing limits to its foreign policy, Somalia, given its strategic geography, faced by competing interests and objectives from multiple external and internal actors (friends and foe) is, by necessity, forced to adopt a different approach to its foreign policy, than what its has been, over the past decades. 

Precisely, the recent shifts in Somalia–Ethiopia relations is one good example. Somalia represents an approach of strategic accommodation rather than confrontation, capitulation or a final settlement since 2024. Potentially, it means, Mogadishu has also moved away from confrontation without abandoning the sovereignty principle that produced it. This matters because Somalia can afford neither permanent hostility with Ethiopia nor a return to political band-wagoning in which the interests of a stronger neighbour begin to define its own foreign policy. In detail, relations deteriorated sharply after Ethiopia’s 1 January 2024 MoU with Somaliland, which envisaged access to the coastline, including a possible naval facility, while opening a potential path towards Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland. Mogadishu regarded the agreement as an infringement of its sovereignty because it had been negotiated directly with Somaliland. The dispute led Somalia to question the future of Ethiopian troops, deepen security cooperation with Egypt and, in September 2024, accuse Ethiopia of taking control of airports in Gedo under the pretext of keeping Egypt out.

Yet permanent confrontation offered no sustainable end-state. Ethiopia is Somalia’s largest immediate neighbour, shares an extensive border with it and remains deeply connected to its security, economy and regional politics. Somalia can resist Ethiopian policies, but geography makes a foreign policy built around permanent confrontation difficult to sustain. The Türkiye-mediated Ankara Declaration of 11 December 2024 provided an alternative. Somalia and Ethiopia reaffirmed respect for each other’s sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity, while recognizing Ethiopia’s interest in reliable and sustainable sea access. Crucially, such access was to operate under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia, including through commercial arrangements such as contracts and leases.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s 3 October 2026 statement that Somalia does not object to Ethiopian access to the sea “through Somali territory” fits this logic. “Through” suggests transit, port use or another negotiated arrangement while the territory remains Somali. It therefore represents less a reversal of Mogadishu’s 2024 position than an attempt to accommodate Ethiopia’s economic objective without conceding the sovereignty principle at the centre of the original dispute.

By the same political matrix, Somalia’s expanding partnership with Egypt reflects a broader strategic calculation aimed at diversifying Somalia’s security partnerships, strengthening diplomatic leverage and reducing excessive dependence on any single regional power, particularly following the January 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum. From Somalia’s national-interest perspective, closer cooperation with Cairo offers opportunities to strengthen its security institutions, expand military training and capacity, reinforce international support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and increase its diplomatic influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Such diversification provides Mogadishu with greater strategic flexibility, potentially strengthening its negotiating position with other regional actors- including neighbouring countries- without necessarily positioning Somalia against them. Yet the value of this partnership depends on whether Mogadishu can translate Egyptian support into lasting national capabilities rather than new forms of external dependence, based on individualised political gains by the current administration in Mogadishu.

More fundamentally, the sustainability of either relationship is constrained by Somalia’s unresolved domestic political and institutional weaknesses. The absence of a coherent Dan Qaran (national interest) strategy leaves foreign-policy priorities vulnerable to personalized leadership, shifting political calculations and inconsistent distinctions between strategic partners and adversaries. Weak institutionalization, including the limited development of professional, merit-based diplomatic and national security institutions, further undermines the capacity to formulate and implement a consistent national strategy. These weaknesses are compounded by Somalia’s fragmented federal politics, contested constitutional framework, disputed institutional mandates and unresolved questions of national unity. Disagreements between Mogadishu and federal member states, particularly Puntland and Jubbaland, complicate the emergence of a broadly accepted national foreign-policy position and weaken the domestic legitimacy necessary to sustain external commitments. Consequently, relations with Ethiopia and Egypt risk becoming extensions of immediate political calculations rather than instruments of enduring national interests. Ultimately, Somalia’s strategic autonomy will depend less on how effectively Mogadishu balances Cairo against Addis Ababa than on whether it can establish the domestic political consensus, constitutional legitimacy and institutional capacity necessary to engage both from a position of national coherence. Without these foundations, diplomatic diversification may expand Somalia’s external partnerships without meaningfully strengthening its independence in foreign-policy decision-making.

Ultimately, Somalia’s evolving relationships with Ethiopia and Egypt present both an opportunity for greater strategic autonomy and a risk of becoming entangled in regional rivalries that are not fundamentally its own. While cooperation with Egypt strengthens Somalia’s security partnerships and negotiating leverage, Addis Ababa may interpret such engagement as strategic encirclement, just as Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions may be perceived in Mogadishu and Cairo as threats to sovereignty and regional security. This emerging security dilemma becomes more consequential amid tensions involving Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, alongside the unresolved Nile dispute and growing competition over the Red Sea. The fundamental distinction is that Somalia balancing its relationships with Ethiopia and Egypt could strengthen its strategic autonomy, whereas Ethiopia and Egypt balancing against each other within Somalia would undermine it. Somalia’s foreign-policy challenge, therefore, extends beyond managing competing regional powers to establishing a coherent national-interest strategy, institutional capacity and domestic political consensus capable of preventing external rivalries from exploiting its internal divisions. Ultimately, the measure of Somalia’s diplomatic success will not be how many strategic partners it attracts, but whether it can translate those relationships into greater sovereignty, national security and independent decision-making without becoming the frontline of someone else’s geopolitical confrontation.