Sunday, November 22, 2026Jobs
The Somali Monitor logo

The Somali Monitor

Independent News, Analysis & Policy Briefing on Somalia and the Horn of Africa

The Somali Monitor

Mogadishu’s Public Land: Evictions, Private Interests and Corruption

As Somalia’s government reclaims valuable public properties, thousands of residents face eviction amid allegations of irregular land transfers. The controversy raises questions about who benefits from Mogadishu’s redevelopment and whether public institutions can account for the assets recovered in the name of the state

By The Somali Monitor·11/3/2026
ShareFacebookXWhatsApp

Mogadishu’s public land controversy exposes a growing contradiction in Somalia’s reconstruction. While the federal government has intensified efforts to reclaim properties occupied during decades of conflict and displacement, thousands of residents have been evicted from land whose subsequent ownership, commercial use and financial benefits remain contested. Beyond the legality of recovering government property lies a more consequential question: what happens to public land after its occupants are removed, and who ultimately benefits?

Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration, government-led land recovery has become an increasingly contentious issue, particularly as rising property values and commercial development reshape the capital. According to the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), June 2026, 143,548 people were recorded as evicted in Mogadishu during 2025, including 63,132 from government properties. The agency also documented 78 protests against land evictions between April 2025 and March 2026, compared with eight during the preceding twelve months. These incidents involved both private developers and government authorities, with some operations reportedly accompanied by security forces, arrests and confrontations.

The growing involvement of public property is particularly significant. October 2026 reporting on Heritage Institute research indicates that the share of recorded evictions involving government-owned land increased from 11% in 2021 to 44% in 2025. The research also cites approximately 2.14 million recorded forced evictions across Somalia between 2017 and September 2026, with Benadir accounting for around 64%. These cumulative figures may include repeated displacement of individuals. Nevertheless, they illustrate how public land recovery has become a major dimension of Mogadishu’s wider displacement crisis.

The consequences extend beyond eviction statistics. In October 2026, the reported killing of Axmed Xassan Rubac inside his home in Mogadishu’s Suuq Bacaad area, amid a disputed demolition, brought renewed attention to the dangers associated with contested land enforcement. His family reportedly maintained that the property was legally owned, while authorities were investigating the circumstances of his death. The case illustrates how unresolved ownership disputes and coercive enforcement can escalate into questions of personal security, legal protection and public confidence. FTL Somalia, October 28, 2026.

More consequential are allegations concerning the fate of recovered government properties. A July 2026 investigation by Baaritaan Digital alleged that more than 180 public properties, estimated by its sources to be worth over US$1 billion, had been transferred to private buyers through questionable procedures. These claims remain unverified through a complete public asset register, individual transfer agreements or reconciled government revenue records. Nevertheless, they raise legitimate questions about which institutions authorized the transactions, whether independent valuations were conducted, who acquired the properties and whether proceeds entered government accounts.

The distinction between reclaiming and disposing of public property is critical. The government may lawfully recover land required for schools, hospitals, military facilities or public administration. However, when properties reclaimed in the public interest are subsequently transferred to commercial actors, the justification requires transparent documentation. The Heritage Institute’s September 2025 policy brief identifies controversies involving properties associated with the Somali National University, the Fire Brigade and the national television compound. These sites offer concrete opportunities to examine whether recovered assets have retained their public functions or undergone changes in ownership and use.

Somalia’s wider corruption record provides important context. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2026 identifies politically influenced property transfers, nontransparent public contracting, land seizures and limited accountability for official misconduct among persistent governance concerns. Similarly, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Transparency International’s February 2026 assessment examines political patronage, weak internal controls and fragmented institutional authority. These problems extend across successive administrations, but their consequences are particularly visible when valuable public assets are managed without accessible records and effective independent oversight.

Unlike ordinary government expenditure, land transfers may involve no immediately visible withdrawal from public accounts. State wealth can be diminished through undervalued sales, preferential leases, disputed ownership changes or allocations of development rights. Where records are incomplete, even legitimate transactions become difficult to scrutinize. Mogadishu’s overlapping responsibilities involving federal ministries, the Benadir Regional Administration and other authorities further complicate the identification of who has the legal power to reclaim, register and dispose of public properties.

The human costs fall disproportionately on internally displaced families, many of whom have occupied informal settlements or former government compounds for years without secure tenure. The EUAA’s 2026 assessment reports that 47% of 2,057 verified displacement sites mapped in Mogadishu at the end of 2024 faced high or extreme eviction risk. Families displaced by conflict, drought and insecurity consequently remain vulnerable to further displacement as urban development increases demand for land.

This exposes another contradiction in Somalia’s humanitarian and development response. International organizations and government institutions have invested for years in shelter, water, sanitation, settlement infrastructure and durable-solutions programming. Yet improved infrastructure can also increase surrounding land values without securing residents’ tenure. As the EUAA observes, the growing commercial attractiveness of integrated urban settlements may heighten eviction risks. Investments intended to improve displaced communities’ living conditions can therefore generate benefits that residents are unable to protect or retain.

Somalia’s 2019 National Eviction Guidelines and broader displacement policies provide safeguards intended to prevent arbitrary evictions. However, repeated displacement raises questions about implementation, including whether affected households receive adequate notice, consultation, alternative accommodation where required and access to legal remedies. Humanitarian agencies may provide temporary shelter after eviction, but they cannot substitute for institutions capable of enforcing land rights and preventing recurring displacement.

The political implications are equally serious. Opposition figures have alleged that some public land transactions benefit politically connected individuals and questioned whether proceeds could be used for political financing. These allegations require transaction-level verification, including property ownership records, valuations, payment trails and evidence of any transfers to political actors. Somalia’s wider corruption record justifies scrutiny but does not independently establish wrongdoing in specific transactions.

Institutional accountability therefore becomes central. During a July 2026 briefing to the Council of Ministers, Federal Auditor General Ahmed Isse Gutale called for stronger financial controls, vendor due diligence and implementation of audit recommendations. Although these findings do not prove misconduct in land transactions, they underscore the importance of extending financial oversight to public asset management. Recovered land represents public wealth, and its transfer should be subject to clear authorization, valuation, disclosure and independent review.

The federal government has legitimate responsibilities to recover occupied public property, restore essential services and support urban development. Private investment can also contribute to Mogadishu’s reconstruction. Yet these objectives require transparent procedures and effective protection of affected residents. Where eviction powers are exercised without publicly verifiable information about subsequent property use, the distinction between legitimate state recovery and potential private enrichment becomes difficult to establish.

Ultimately, Mogadishu’s land controversy is more than a dispute over ownership. It reflects Somalia’s wider challenge of building institutions capable of exercising authority while protecting public resources and citizens’ rights. A publicly accessible register of reclaimed properties, disclosure of subsequent sales and leases, independent valuations and reconciliation of proceeds with government accounts would provide a stronger basis for accountability.

For displaced families, the immediate consequences are lost shelter, livelihoods and security. For Somalia’s wider public, the unresolved question is what happens to valuable assets recovered in its name. Until the government can demonstrate who controls these properties, how they were allocated and where their financial benefits went, Mogadishu’s public land controversy will remain a test of whether Somalia’s reconstruction serves the public interest or allows valuable state resources to be captured without sufficient scrutiny.

info@thesomalimonitor.com