The Somali Monitor
How Turkey’s Partnership Is Strengthening Hassan Sheikh’s Presidency in Somalia.
Turkey’s expanding military, diplomatic and economic partnership with Somalia is strengthening President Hassan Sheikh’s political position amid constitutional disputes and federal tensions. While Ankara’s stated objectives focus on security and development, the use of Turkish-supported state capabilities in domestic political confrontations raises questions about executive power, institutional accountability and Turkey’s perceived neutrality

President Hassan Sheikh meets Turkish Ambassador Alper Aktaş, May 16, 2026. Photo: Villa Somalia.
Mogadisho – Somalia, November 1 2026: Turkey’s expanding military, diplomatic and economic partnership with Somalia has created significant political advantages for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud amid disputes over his constitutional mandate and relations with federal member states. However, Turkey’s role in strengthening Somalia’s institutions must be distinguished from how Hassan Sheikh uses the resulting military capabilities, diplomatic relationships and economic commitments to consolidate his political authority. Ankara’s stated objectives centre on security cooperation, counterterrorism, maritime protection and economic development. Hassan Sheikh, meanwhile, benefits from controlling the federal institutions through which much of this assistance is delivered. The distinction matters because the political consequences of foreign assistance do not necessarily establish foreign involvement in domestic political decisions. Yet the March 2026 takeover of Baidoa, involving Turkish-trained Gorgor forces, demonstrates how internationally supported national capabilities can influence Somalia’s internal balance of power.
Turkey’s diplomatic engagement illustrates this distinction. On May 16, 2026, immediately after the date opposition leaders considered the expiration of Hassan Sheikh’s presidential mandate, Turkish Ambassador Alper Aktaş met him at Villa Somalia. According to Garowe Online, the meeting reaffirmed bilateral cooperation despite unsuccessful political negotiations. For Ankara, maintaining relations with Somalia’s internationally recognized federal government is consistent with diplomatic practice and its long-term commitments. For Hassan Sheikh, however, the timing offered an opportunity to demonstrate continued international acceptance despite opposition challenges to his authority. His April meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan similarly reinforced his position as Turkey’s principal Somali counterpart. Such engagement does not confer constitutional legitimacy, but the incumbent can use it to project political continuity and strengthen his negotiating position.
The distinction becomes more consequential in military cooperation. Through the TURKSOM training facility, Gorgor special forces and the 2024 defence framework, Turkey has helped Somalia develop national security capabilities intended primarily for counterterrorism and territorial defence. The deployment and command of Somali forces, however, remain matters of Somali governmental responsibility. According to the Critical Threats Project’s April 2 assessment, Turkish-trained Gorgor units participated in the March federal offensive that culminated in the removal of South West State President Abdiaziz Laftagareen from Baidoa. The involvement of Turkish-trained forces does not establish that Ankara planned, authorized or directed the operation. Nevertheless, Hassan Sheikh’s administration benefited from capabilities developed through the partnership, enabling federal forces to prevail in a confrontation with a regional administration rather than securing a negotiated political settlement.
The Baidoa operation consequently raises questions about the political use of externally supported military capabilities. South West officials alleged that Turkish-supplied drones and other foreign equipment supported the offensive. In September, Laftagareen’s representatives further accused Turkey of conducting F-16 airstrikes against forces attempting to regain control of Baidoa, allegations reported by Hiiraan Online and examined by the Critical Threats Project. Direct Turkish involvement remains unverified, while federal officials rejected allegations that Ankara engineered Laftagareen’s removal. The established political consequence is narrower but significant: the federal executive exercised military superiority using forces whose capabilities had been strengthened by an external partner. This altered the balance between Mogadishu and South West State, reinforcing concerns that national security institutions could become instruments of political coercion.
Similar concerns emerged during the June 3–5 confrontations in Mogadishu involving federal forces and armed groups aligned with former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire. As Reuters reported, Sharif accused government forces of attacking his residence, while Khaire alleged that troops deployed drones, anti-tank weapons and other heavy equipment in civilian areas. Reuters could not independently verify these weapons allegations, and the federal government disputed the opposition’s account. There is no established evidence linking Turkey to the alleged drone deployments. The episode therefore cannot be presented as a Turkish military intervention. It instead highlights the responsibility of Somalia’s political leadership to prevent national security institutions from becoming involved in violent confrontations over constitutional authority.
These developments have complicated Turkey’s attempts to maintain diplomatic neutrality. In April, opposition leaders reportedly met Ambassador Alper Aktaş at Sharif’s residence to express concerns about Ankara’s perceived alignment with Hassan Sheikh. Turkish mediation efforts in July subsequently encountered resistance from Puntland and Jubaland, which questioned whether a government providing extensive military assistance to Mogadishu could serve as an impartial intermediary. According to Hiiraan Online, Turkish officials nevertheless engaged government and opposition representatives in efforts to resolve the electoral dispute. Ankara’s mediation indicates an interest in political stability rather than necessarily preserving Hassan Sheikh’s presidency. Yet Hassan Sheikh benefits from an institutional asymmetry: as the incumbent, he controls the governmental channels through which Turkey maintains its principal security and diplomatic relationships. This advantage can strengthen his position in negotiations without proving that Ankara endorses his disputed political decisions.
Economic cooperation produces a comparable distinction between Turkey’s investment objectives and Hassan Sheikh’s political benefits. The April 2026 offshore drilling initiative involving the Çağrı Bey vessel forms part of Ankara’s longer-term interest in energy exploration and maritime cooperation. President Erdoğan reaffirmed the project during his April meeting with Hassan Sheikh, while Turkish involvement in Mogadishu’s airport, seaport and security infrastructure reflects an established bilateral relationship. For Turkey, these commitments serve strategic and commercial objectives. For Hassan Sheikh, they provide visible achievements that can reinforce his administration’s development narrative amid constitutional uncertainty. However, exploration does not guarantee commercial production or public revenue, and the political value of investment announcements may emerge before economic benefits reach Somali citizens. Transparent agreements, parliamentary scrutiny and equitable resource-sharing remain essential to ensuring that these projects serve national rather than incumbent political interests. Turkish Presidency, April 16, 2026.
The same institutional distinction applies to parliamentary and government communications cooperation. Speaker Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, who signed the 2024 defence framework while serving as defence minister, has maintained close institutional relations with Ankara and publicly defended bilateral cooperation during the September controversy. Somali and Turkish officials have also discussed cooperation on government communications and countering disinformation. Such initiatives can strengthen public administration and strategic communication. Their domestic political implications, however, depend on how Somali officials exercise their authority. When senior political figures promote agreements they are also expected to scrutinize, questions arise about independent parliamentary oversight. Similarly, efforts to counter disinformation require safeguards distinguishing legitimate public communication from the suppression of political criticism.
These developments reflect overlapping but not necessarily identical interests. Turkey seeks security cooperation, strategic access, economic opportunities and a stable governmental counterpart, while Hassan Sheikh benefits from the military capabilities, diplomatic recognition and development opportunities associated with that relationship. An April report by Garowe Online cited an unnamed diplomat suggesting Ankara preferred Hassan Sheikh’s continued leadership, although this remains an unverified assessment rather than established Turkish policy. The more demonstrable concern is structural: extensive foreign cooperation with institutions controlled by an incumbent can create political advantages even when the external partner does not directly intervene in domestic disputes.
Turkey’s contributions to Somalia’s security and development remain substantial, and its responsibility should not be conflated with decisions taken by Hassan Sheikh’s administration. Nevertheless, the partnership’s consequences cannot be assessed solely through Ankara’s stated intentions. Baidoa illustrates how Turkish-trained Somali forces can influence federal political outcomes; Mogadishu’s confrontations demonstrate the risks of militarizing constitutional disagreements; and sustained diplomatic and economic engagement strengthens the incumbent’s political standing. The central issue is therefore not whether Turkey has deliberately sought to prolong Hassan Sheikh’s presidency, but whether Somalia’s leadership is using internationally supported state capabilities to consolidate political power without adequate constitutional, parliamentary and federal safeguards. For Ankara, the corresponding challenge is ensuring that its long-term partnership strengthens Somali institutions independently of whichever president occupies Villa Somalia
