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The Somali Monitor

President Farmaajo or Hassan Sheikh: Who Is Better for Somalia's State-Building?

The comparison between Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh highlights contrasting approaches to leadership, state-building and political compromise. Farmaajo's presidency was marked by institutional reforms, efforts to restore national sovereignty and, despite political controversies, an eventual willingness to negotiate and facilitate a peaceful transfer of power. Hassan Sheikh's pursuit of constitutional changes, party expansion and greater presidential authority has generated disputes over federal power-sharing and political inclusion. The analysis examines why compromise, rather than the consolidation of power, remains essential to protecting Somalia's hard-won institutional gains and the future of its Third Republic.

By The Somali Monitor·10/31/2026

“Somalia's presidential transition, May 2022.

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MOGADISHU, Somalia — Somalia's deepening political divisions have renewed scrutiny of the contrasting leadership records of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, particularly their approaches to state-building, sovereignty, constitutional reform and federal relations. Farmaajo pursued financial and military reforms, assertive diplomacy and constitutional negotiations despite controversies over regional elections and his attempted mandate extension, eventually accepting a negotiated settlement and peacefully transferring power in May 2022. Hassan Sheikh has advanced constitutional restructuring, direct elections and the expansion of his Justice and Unity Party (JSP) amid opposition from Puntland, Jubaland and other political actors. Although intended to strengthen democratic governance, these initiatives have intensified disputes over federal authority and representation, raising a fundamental question: are Somalia's institutions becoming stronger than individual presidencies, or increasingly vulnerable to political competition?

Somalia's federal system emerged from the recognition that rebuilding national authority after the 1991 collapse required negotiated power-sharing rather than centralized control. The 2012 Provisional Constitution established this foundation but left important questions concerning powers, security and public resources unresolved. Under Farmaajo, constitutional review proceeded through parliamentary institutions, independent commissions and federal-state consultations, although disagreements with Puntland and Jubaland prevented its completion. Hassan Sheikh's administration subsequently secured constitutional amendments in March 2026, including revised electoral arrangements and five-year presidential and parliamentary terms, despite significant political objections. While Mogadishu presents the process as completed, its acceptance remains contested, illustrating how formal constitutional changes can lack the political consensus necessary for implementation. (UNDP; ConstitutionNet; BTI Somalia Country Report).

These disagreements have extended into federal-state relations, with Puntland, Jubaland and opposition leaders challenging the government's approach while JSP-aligned administrations have become central to its electoral agenda. In South West State, the breakdown between Mogadishu and President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen culminated in the federal takeover of Baidoa in March 2026, his departure and the establishment of a JSP-aligned administration under former parliamentary speaker Aden Madobe. Subsequent political leverage by Mogadisho have not resolved the confrontation, leaving civilians, particularly displaced communities, exposed to further insecurity. Farmaajo's handling of the controversial 2018 South West election also involved allegations of federal interference and serious political tensions, but his administration managed it without a comparable prolonged struggle over regional leadership. The contrast highlights the importance of proven leadership, and an accepted political settlement in preventing federal-state disputes from becoming wider security crises. (UN Panel of Experts, 2019; Reuters, August 2026).

Hirshabelle presents a similar challenge, complicated by longstanding Hawadle–Abgaal disagreements over representation and power-sharing. Despite Hassan Sheikh's Abgaal background, his administration's support for Ali Abdullahi Guudlaawe's continuation in office has faced opposition from influential Hawadle politicians and elders who regard the arrangement as externally imposed. JSP's reported victory in 78 of the regional parliament's 99 seats facilitated Guudlaawe's re-election without resolving these grievances. The dispute has acquired a security dimension through reports of Macawiisley mobilization involving supporters of former intelligence chief Abdullahi Mohamed Ali Sanbalolshe and contested claims concerning the Lama-Galaay compound in Beledweyne, which require independent verification. Such developments raise concerns that community forces previously mobilized against Al-Shabaab could become involved in political confrontation. Although Guudlaawe's initial election under Farmaajo in 2020 also generated Hawadle grievances, it was something Presdeint Farmaajo managed well with political accommodation.

Within Somalia's clan-based political system, JSP's expansion across South West State, Galmudug and Hirshabelle raises questions beyond ordinary party competition. National parties could reduce dependence on clan selection, patronage and recurring political settlements, but such a transition requires broad consensus, credible elections, opposition participation and separation between governing-party interests and federal authority. When constitutional amendments, regional leadership changes and electoral processes are simultaneously contested, concentrating political power within one party risks deepening divisions rather than strengthening democratic institutions. The central issue is whether party expansion reflects an inclusive political transition or further consolidation of presidential influence at the expense of negotiated federal arrangements.

Farmaajo's own electoral crisis offers an important comparison. After his mandate expired in February 2021, Parliament approved a two-year extension that he signed, provoking armed confrontation and political resistance. The decision exposed the dangers of unilateral presidential action. Nevertheless, the extension was reversed, electoral coordination shifted to Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble, and negotiations produced the May 27 agreement. Farmaajo subsequently accepted Hassan Sheikh's electoral victory and transferred power peacefully in May 2022. Although this did not erase his political shortcomings, it demonstrated that even a serious constitutional confrontation could be resolved through negotiation and recognition of political limits. (African Union Peace and Security Council, May 2021; United Nations, May 2022).

These political divisions place decades of national reconstruction at risk. Emerging from state collapse, conflict and international isolation, Somalia has rebuilt elements of its military, restored financial management systems, secured international debt relief, strengthened diplomatic relations and reasserted sovereign authority over its airspace, territorial waters and national resources. Federal member states, public institutions, domestic revenue systems and international financial partnerships have provided foundations for economic recovery, while security reforms, including biometric registration, salary payments and military professionalization, have strengthened efforts against Al-Shabaab. Yet these achievements remain vulnerable when federal disputes weaken cooperation, security forces become entangled in internal confrontations and competing external interests complicate national sovereignty. Political instability risks diverting resources from counterinsurgency and undermining the institutional, economic and diplomatic progress achieved through decades of national and international investment.

The resulting contradiction is increasingly evident: constitutional, electoral and administrative activity continues while the political consensus required to sustain it weakens. Parliamentary amendments, party majorities and regional administrations cannot independently strengthen the federation when their legitimacy remains contested. Puntland and Jubaland's opposition, the confrontation in South West State and divisions in Hirshabelle demonstrate the risk of growing separation between administrations aligned with Mogadishu and those challenging its authority. Somalia's Third Republic still maintains functioning institutions, international partnerships and essential services, but unresolved disputes threaten federal cooperation and shared national authority. The danger is not necessarily another collapse comparable to 1991, but a gradual weakening of institutions that retain formal powers without sufficient political acceptance to exercise them effectively.

Ultimately, the comparison between Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh extends beyond presidential authority to their leadership approaches, political priorities and willingness to compromise. Farmaajo's record combined administrative reforms, assertive diplomacy and efforts to restore sovereignty with serious political mistakes, yet his eventual reversal of the mandate extension and acceptance of the 2022 transition demonstrated the role of compromise in resolving a national crisis. Hassan Sheikh's constitutional and electoral reforms seek to address longstanding institutional weaknesses, but critics view their implementation and JSP's expansion as increasingly concentrated on presidential authority through contested decisions. Their durability depends on agreement beyond his governing coalition. Somalia therefore needs more than another electoral timetable or expanded party influence: it requires a negotiated settlement that reconciles constitutional reform with federal power-sharing, protects the neutrality of national security institutions and restores political confidence. Without such accommodation, the Third Republic risks prolonged stagnation, deeper fragmentation and the erosion of its hard-won achievements. Somalia's future depends not simply on the authority its presidents exercise, but on their willingness to limit that authority when national unity and institutional survival are at stake.

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