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Erdoğan–Mohamud COP31 Meeting Highlights Türkiye’s Growing Influence in Somalia

The November 12 meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on the sidelines of COP31 in Antalya reaffirmed Ankara's growing influence over Somalia's security, political and economic future. Coming amid a deepening electoral crisis, uncertainty over international security assistance and growing scrutiny of energy agreements, the meeting raises critical questions about Türkiye's political neutrality, Somalia's sovereignty and the risks of strategic dependency. The central challenge is whether Ankara's expanding engagement will strengthen Somalia's national institutions and political stability or increasingly reinforce the interests of the incumbent administration

By The Somali Monitor·11/13/2026

Photo: COP31 Meeting, Antalya, Türkiye — November 12, 2026.

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According to Daily Sabah, the two leaders discussed expanding cooperation in defence, energy and other strategic sectors, while Erdoğan emphasized Somalia's stability, national unity and the importance of political dialogue. Although presented as a routine diplomatic engagement, the meeting occurred at a particularly sensitive moment, when Türkiye's expanding influence intersects with Somalia's contested political transition, security challenges and emerging natural resource economy.

Since Erdoğan's landmark visit to Mogadishu in 2011, Türkiye's relationship with Somalia has evolved from humanitarian assistance and reconstruction into one of the country's most extensive strategic partnerships. The establishment of Camp TURKSOM in 2017 institutionalized Ankara's military presence, while the February 2024 Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement expanded cooperation in maritime security and defence. Together, these arrangements have positioned Türkiye as a central external actor in Somalia's security architecture and an increasingly influential partner in the Horn of Africa.

This relationship has become particularly consequential as Somalia confronts uncertainty surrounding the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Funding shortages, questions over future troop contributions and the continuing threat posed by al-Shabaab have increased pressure on Somali forces to assume greater security responsibilities. Turkish-trained Gorgor units, alongside other national formations, represent an important component of this transition. However, military training and equipment transfers alone cannot guarantee sustainable security without unified command structures, reliable financing and accountable institutions capable of operating independently of external assistance.

The sensitivity of Türkiye's military involvement became evident in early November when reports alleged that President Mohamud had requested approximately 15,000 additional Turkish troops. Ankara's Ministry of National Defence rejected the claims, clarifying that its existing engagement remains focused on military training, advisory assistance and counterterrorism capacity-building rather than a large-scale deployment. As Daily Sabah reported, the denial distinguished established military cooperation from speculation about expanded Turkish combat involvement.

Nevertheless, the controversy raises a broader concern about the political implications of external military assistance. Somalia's security institutions operate in an environment of persistent tensions between Mogadishu and federal member states, particularly Puntland and Jubaland. Where national forces become involved in politically contested domestic operations, perceptions that externally trained units are reinforcing centralized political authority can undermine confidence in their neutrality. Türkiye's contribution to Somalia's security must therefore be assessed not only by operational capabilities but also by whether it strengthens nationally accountable institutions.

These concerns are inseparable from Somalia's deepening constitutional and electoral crisis. Disagreements over constitutional amendments, disputed federal mandates and electoral arrangements have intensified divisions between President Mohamud's administration, opposition leaders and federal member states. The reported November 5 Supreme Court ruling challenging the continuation of federal mandates has added further controversy, although its legal implications and political acceptance remain contested.

Against this backdrop, Erdoğan's emphasis on national dialogue carries considerable diplomatic significance. Türkiye previously facilitated the December 2024 Ankara Declaration, which helped establish a framework for reducing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia over maritime access and territorial sovereignty. Yet mediating Somalia's internal political crisis presents a more complex challenge, involving competing constitutional interpretations, entrenched political rivalries and unresolved federal power-sharing disputes.

Türkiye's reported participation alongside the United States, United Kingdom and European Union in facilitating electoral consultations scheduled for November 14–18 could provide an opportunity to encourage political compromise. However, Ankara's extensive military, economic and diplomatic ties with Mohamud's administration also create questions about its perceived neutrality. Recent Turkish diplomatic engagement with former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo and other opposition figures suggests an effort to maintain communication across political divides, but the credibility of mediation will depend on whether Puntland, Jubaland and other political stakeholders participate meaningfully in determining the electoral framework.

This presents a central dilemma for Ankara. Its strategic relationship with the Federal Government gives it considerable influence to encourage dialogue, yet the same relationship could complicate its credibility as an impartial facilitator. The concern is not necessarily direct Turkish interference, but whether its diplomatic engagement promotes a genuinely inclusive settlement or becomes associated with political arrangements that significant Somali stakeholders consider illegitimate.

Beyond security and political mediation, energy cooperation has emerged as another defining pillar of the partnership. The 2024 bilateral agreements opened Somalia's offshore hydrocarbon sector to Turkish exploration, including seismic surveys conducted by the Oruç Reis research vessel. As Reuters reported, the arrangements offer potential investment, technical expertise and future government revenue. However, questions concerning contractual transparency, cost recovery, parliamentary oversight and revenue-sharing remain politically consequential. DeSmog's November 2026 reporting has further highlighted concerns surrounding the governance of these agreements.

The implications extend beyond potential commercial discoveries. In Somalia's contested federal system, decisions involving strategic natural resources risk reinforcing political grievances if negotiated without sufficient transparency and institutional consultation. The Antalya meeting also highlights a notable contradiction: while held during a global climate conference, much of the bilateral agenda concerned fossil-fuel exploration and security cooperation, even as Somalia faces recurrent droughts, flooding, displacement and other climate-related humanitarian challenges.

Taken together, Türkiye's involvement in military training, maritime security, energy exploration and political mediation places Ankara in an increasingly influential position over Somalia's national trajectory. For Türkiye, the relationship advances its strategic presence near important maritime corridors connecting the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. For Somalia, it provides essential security capabilities, diplomatic support and potential economic opportunities. Yet the concentration of external influence across these sectors also raises the risk of long-term dependency unless accompanied by stronger domestic institutions, transparent agreements and diversified international partnerships.

The implications are particularly significant for Somalia's political transition. A partnership that strengthens national security capabilities while supporting inclusive dialogue could contribute to institutional stability and reduce opportunities for al-Shabaab to exploit political divisions. Conversely, external assistance perceived as reinforcing the incumbent administration, combined with opaque economic arrangements, could deepen mistrust between Mogadishu, opposition leaders and federal member states.

Ultimately, the Erdoğan–Mohamud meeting on the sidelines of COP31 reflects more than the continuity of a longstanding bilateral relationship. It underscores Türkiye's increasingly central role in Somalia's security transition, political diplomacy and emerging resource economy at a moment when the legitimacy of national institutions remains contested.

The immediate test will be whether Ankara's diplomatic influence contributes to a credible and inclusive electoral settlement. The longer-term test will be whether its military and economic cooperation strengthens Somalia's institutional independence rather than creating new forms of strategic dependency. For Somalia, the challenge is not whether to maintain its partnership with Türkiye, but how to ensure that expanding cooperation strengthens national sovereignty, political consensus and public accountability. For Ankara, the challenge is to demonstrate that its influence serves the Somali state beyond the political interests of any individual administration. The true significance of Antalya will ultimately depend on whether Türkiye's expanding engagement leaves Somalia better equipped to determine its own political, security and economic future.

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