The Somali Monitor
When Federalism Fails in Somalia: What Next for Puntland?
This document analyzes the historical and political dynamics surrounding Puntland's place within Somalia's federal structure. As one of the foundational federal member states established in 1998, Puntland chose state reconstruction and federalism over secession. However, recurring constitutional disputes and political friction with the Federal Government in Mogadishu—particularly over centralized authority, resource allocation, electoral models, and unilateral constitutional revisions—have placed severe strain on the federal compact.
Among Somalia’s six (6) federal member states, Puntland, established in 1998, is the parent, counting three years, to complete its thirtieth anniversary. Given its foundational vision, Puntland presents a different state-building criterion, in Somalia’s long-running constitutional federal arrangement debate and over territorial unity and one-united Somalia. While Somaliland declared independence, subsequently constructed its political project around succession and separation from the rest of Somalia, just five (5) months, into Siad Barre flew out of Mogadishu on the 26th of January 199, Puntland did the opposite. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland deliberately chose another path of state reconstruction and state-building with the rest of the Somali people, even when there was significant disorder at the South and Central regions of the country characterised by lawless and civil war. In Aug 1998, local communities, traditional clan elders and leaders, predominantly from the Harti-Darood clan families, including Majeerteen, Dhulbahante, and Warsengeli agreed to form the autonomous federal state of Puntland- later known as the mother of all post-federal member states formed including Galmudug, Jubbaland and etc. Strategic as the vision was from the founders of Puntland, the intent was of autonomous federal state “Puntland” was not to abandon Somalia but help re-construct Somalia through functional federalism. Today, that vision and history make the growing debate over Puntland’s future particularly consequential: the strongest argument for reconsidering its place in Somalia comes precisely from the fact that Puntland spent nearly three decades trying to make Somalia’s unity work.
Evidence shows Puntland’s contributions to the state-building of Somalia as substantial and potentially exceeds expectation as a federal members state with its own state-building challenges. Most notably, it has produced Abdullahi Yusuuf (may Allah have mercy on him) who led Somalia as the president of the Transitional Federal Government from Oct 2004 until 29 Dec 2008. Additionally, through the 4.5 clan-based federal system fully adopted in 2004, Somalia benefited from the participation of the numerous prominent figures from its regions including former prime minsters, minsters, member of parliaments, director generals and other key office holders across senior, and junior government levels, including to the present day of the current government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. By any measure possible, Puntland has heavily invested in the reconstruction of Somalia as a sovereign functional state-nation and the formation of other federal member states including Jubbaland has often become Puntland’s trademark and a display that its original political project extended far beyond its regions and borders. It participated in national reconciliation processes, helped shape a functional constitutional federalism, contributed to the political negotiations that eventually produced the post-transition federal order, and hosted important constitutional processes in 2012. Puntland did not merely profess Somali unity; it invested political leadership and institutional capital in rebuilding it.
Given this backdrop, along-standing argument has been that subsequent administrations in Mogadishu have, in varying degrees, continued to undermine both the trajectory of Puntland state-building process and the broader federal project of Somalia. Seen in this perspective, Puntlanders’ skepticism therefore becomes real, and rational, thus leading to the uncomfortable question of “If, Puntland’s foundational aspirations and expectations to the Somali state-building project is compromised and fundamentally altered constitutionally; how justifiable is it for Puntland to re-consider its position in Somalia- particularly if the claim is that Mogadishu is increasingly shifting the state-building trajectory away from the order of functional federalism towards what seems centralism, without her consent and that of other federal member states in the country, as outlined by the 2012 federal constitution.
Article 4 and the Idea of Conditional Federalism
Article 4 (1): “Puntland State is part of Somalia; its duty is to contribute to the establishment and protection of a Somali government based on a federal system. Article 4 (2): “The powers that Puntland State shall cede to the Federal Government of Somalia and those that will be preserved shall be determined through negotiation between the Federal Government of Somalia and Puntland State and shall be set out in the Federal Constitution of Somalia and the Puntland State Constitution”
Puntland’s own constitutional framework provides a cushion for situations of significant stray from federalism and makes that question particularly significant and rationally relevant. Constitutionally, Article 4 affirms that Puntland is part of Somalia and commits it to contributing to the establishment and protection of a Somali government based on federalism, while cooperating with the federal government and other federal member states in the country. But arguably, the same constitutional architecture also links that relationship to the successful establishment of a functioning federal system and provides a mechanism through which Puntland can reconsider its status under specified circumstances.
Scholarly, Article 4 can therefore be better understood not simply as a secession clause, but as an expression of conditional functional federalism. Puntland’s founders preferred Somali unity, but they understood federalism as the institutional bargain through which that unity would operate. They appear to have anticipated the possibility that Somalia could fail to agree on such a system or remain trapped indefinitely in instability, and they sought to preserve Puntland’s ability to reconsider its position.
This distinction matters today. The central question is not simply whether Puntland can “leave Somalia.” It is whether the political and constitutional conditions underpinning Puntland’s original commitment to the Somali federation continue to exist. At its core, the overall concept of Puntland’s Article 4 can also be understood to set the fundamentals of better governance in Somalia, as a whole through the establishment of a genuine and functional federal system.
Puntland and the Federal Project in Mogadisho
Puntland has proved time and again to be the champion of federalization in Somalia, particularly after Somalis have agreed to govern themselves though a federal system. Since 2012, Puntland and subsequent Federal Government in Mogadisho have repeatedly disagreed over major constitutional provisions including how elections, security, resources and the distribution of federal powers should be handled- ultimately leading to the finalizations of Somalia’s federalization and the completion of the 2012 Provisional Federal Constitution. With or without the sidings of other federal member states, and despite persistent difficulties and misunderstandings; Garowe consistently remained steady resilient within the national political and federalization process, returning to negotiation tables after successive disagreements and confrontations. This reflected Puntland's longstanding conception of Somalia as a negotiated federation in which federal constituent states retain meaningful constitutional authority rather, as opposed to functioning as administrative extensions of Mogadishu. This, for so long, have becomes a political tag-of- war, often dividing existing federal member states, with Jubbaland often aligning with Puntland for her own reasons while the likes of Galmudug and Hirshabelle states found closer to the side of the Mogadishu.
Against this backdrop, the recent constitutional step processes by the current administration at Villa Somalia, beginning in 2022, changed the overall character of those disagreements. The present administration of President HE Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, elected to office in May 2022, has moved the needle, passing significant laws and legislations that have marked an important shift in the country’s political and constitutional direction. A commentary by Somali Public Agenda’s Executive Director Mr. Mahad Wasuge in March 2026 fathomed that “Five (5) key political agreements have been signed during the term of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud including (1) the allocation of powers (December 2022); (2) the judicial model (December 2022); (3) fiscal federalism (March 2023); (4) the National Security Architecture (March 2023); and (5) elections (May 2023). However, although these agreements informed the review of contentious constitutional issues, they were not widely seen as reflective of a broader political consensus, as they all favored the center over the periphery. Puntland, a key Federal Member State, was not part of any of these agreements”
With informed judgement, the 2012 Provisional Constitution had left much of Somalia's federal settlements deliberately unfinished, as Somalia’s state-building processes was an on-going not-easy processes – and includes the Somaliland issue. Article 54 oof the 2012 Provisional Constitution required the allocation of powers and resources beyond four exclusive federal competencies – foreign affairs, citizenship and Immigration, national defense and monetary policy- to be negotiated and agreed between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, while Article 142 protected the consultative position of pre-existing Federal Member States. More explicitly, Article 142 (2) goes beyond merely encouraging consultation, and requires that existing Federal Member States to be consulted in decisions concerning the federal system and national security arrangements, making their participation a core element of the constitutional process. Its therefore evident, that the original constitutional architecture envisaged the completion of Somalia’s federal system and its 2012 provisional constitution as a negotiated process between its constituent levels of governments, and not simply legislation from the centre. Therefore understandably, Puntland’s constitutional project was explicitly constructed around eventual membership in a federal Somalia, while emphasising consensus, decentralised authority and negotiated relations with the national government in its capital city; Mogadishu. Federalism was therefore not incidental to Puntland's commitment to Somalia’s unity; it was the political condition through which that unity was expected to function.
The March 2024 amendments – which culminated to the approval of chapter 1-4 of the 2012 provisional constitutional- therefore marked a critical juncture to the present constitutional rupture between Mogadisho and Garowe. The processes emerged partly from the National Consultative Council agreements reached without Puntland and were subsequently approved by large parliamentary majorities, with Mogadisho providing the leadership and impetus. Puntland responded on 31 March by withdrawing recognition and confidence from federal institutions until, in its words, a comprehensive constitutional framework was “negotiated and agreed upon”, while declaring that it would exercise independent powers in the interim. Furthermore, Puntland argued President Hassan’s Sheikh constitutional changes violated Article 1 of the present-day 2012 provisional constitution, and characterised the amendments as serving political interests and, on that basis, Puntland asserted the process null and void while challenging the constitutional legitimacy of his government.
But importantly, the Federal Government maintained that the Constitution remained open to further amendment until eventual referendum—demonstrating that even after the parliamentary vote, the constitutional settlement was not politically uncontested or institutionally complete.
The process nevertheless continued without restoring Puntland to the federal consensus. UN reporting shows that Puntland remained outside the National Consultative Council, Jubaland later joined it in rejecting the March 2024 amendments, and significant disagreements over federalisation and state-building remained unresolved. By 2025, Puntland and Jubaland were jointly reaffirming their rejection of those amendments even as the Federal Government pursued further constitutional amendments and electoral reforms including the completion of the remaining chapters (5-15) approved by March 2026. Additionally, a parallel transformation on Somalia electoral system was already underway, as both houses had enacted a new electoral framework, established the National Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission, opened political party registrations and initiated voter registration as part of the transition from indirect elections towards what’s called “Universal suffrage of 1 person-1vote clan-based model”.
Unlike previous disagreements between Mogadishu and Garowe; the present constitutional rupture goes deeper, touching contested claims and boundaries between central and decentralized authority at the heart of Somalia’s state-building trajectory. Without resolving the underlying political and institutional disagreement the dispute has consequently moved beyond individual constitutional provisions. Mogadishu increasingly relies on parliamentary amendment and national institutions as sufficient authority to advance constitutional completion; as Puntland, together with Jubbaland and prominent opposition leaders maintains that Parliament cannot, by itself, substitute for the negotiated federal compact from which those institutions derive their legitimacy.
The Jubbaland Factor: Puntland’s Making of a Federalist Bloc including Ousted President Laftagareen of Southwest State of Somalia
Puntland’s constitutional disagreement with Mogadishu becomes even more complex when viewed alongside Jubbaland, as a sister member state, bonded by the same clan-based power-sharing formula of federal governance in the country. President Said Abdullahi Deni and Jubbaland’s Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) have increasingly converged around a similar political position, as it happened in the past federal-state disputes. While both Jubbaland and Puntland’s political and constitutional circumstances may be different, the two administrations, both rooted in a predominantly Darood constituencies share concerns over the federal role and interferences in the autonomy and constitutional authority of the federal member states. Both administrations reject the unilateral changes of the 2012 provisional constitution, that in their view, primarily by-passes unresolved federal issues including the power and resource-sharing matters, security arrangements, electoral models and the formation of an inclusive National Independent Commission. All together, respective position of both Puntland and Jubbaland reflects resistance to the concentration of significant authority in Mogadishu, while shifting towards a more centralized power structure. This argument further reinforces that fundamental constitutional changes culminating to the completion of the 2012 provisional constitution cannot be driven unilaterally from the centre but must emerge through broader consultations, negotiations and agreement among the federation’s constituents’ actors. Given the weight of both administrations makes the entanglement dynamics a serious gridlock as their coordination and participation in a wider opposition platform mean that what could once be portrayed primarily as a Puntland–FGS confrontation has changed, signaling a potential broader deadlock and stagnation over the future architecture of the Somali state-building process.
Domestically, the Somali 4.5 clan-based politics comes to play, and makes Puntland’s argument politically relevant when Jubbaland is added to the equation. Puntland and important constituencies underpinning Jubbaland draw from the wider Darood clan-family, creating social and political networks through which cooperation can develop. But reducing their convergence simply to clan solidarity would miss the more consequential development. Their present alignment is increasingly ideological and institutional as much as genealogical. Both administrations increasingly articulate a similar conception of federalism: one in which Federal Member States retain meaningful political and constitutional autonomy rather than gradually becoming subordinate units of an increasingly powerful centre.
Similarly, the Puntland–Jubbaland alignment becomes more consequential when understood not simply as an alliance between two Federal Member States, but as an emerging strategy for widening the political space from which Mogadishu’s approach to the federation can be challenged. This was illustrated by their alignment with the ousted South-West administration led by President Abdiaziz Laftagareen during his confrontation with the federal government and the political crisis that culminated in his removal from power following federal military intervention. The episode temporarily expanded what had largely been a Garowe–Kismayo axis into a potentially broader federalist coalition around state autonomy, electoral arrangements, constitutional change, and the distribution of authority between the federal government and its member states. More importantly, it demonstrated how a confrontation involving one Federal Member State could cease to be treated as an isolated Puntland-Mogadishu dispute and instead become part of a wider contest over the rules governing Somalia’s federation. In this sense, Puntland and Jubbaland have increasingly sought to connect separate centre–state disputes into a broader political argument about the limits of federal authority and the constitutional space of the member states, in line with the 2012 provisional constitution.
That strategy acquires another dimension beyond Somalia’s borders. Both administrations possess regional and international relationships that provide political and diplomatic channels beyond Mogadishu. Jubbaland’s longstanding connections with Kenya and engagement with Ethiopia, alongside Puntland’s extensive security and economic relationship with the UAE, give Garowe and Kismayo additional avenues through which their political and security concerns can reach regional governments and international partners. These relationships should not necessarily be interpreted as automatic foreign endorsement of their positions: Kenya, Ethiopia and the UAE pursue their own strategic interests and simultaneously maintain important relations with Somalia’s federal government. Their significance instead lies in the additional diplomatic and strategic space they create. Combined with engagement with the United Nations and other international partners, this allows the Puntland–Jubbaland axis to operate across two interconnected arenas—within Somalia’s contested federal politics and within the wider regional and international diplomatic environment.
Seen through this lens, the strength of the emerging bloc lies less in the number of administrations permanently aligned with it than in its ability to generate multiple centres of political leverage. Domestically, coalition-building makes it more difficult to reduce each confrontation to a bilateral dispute between Villa Somalia and an individual Federal Member State; externally, regional relationships provide additional platforms through which those concerns can be amplified. The result is therefore not necessarily a fixed anti-Mogadishu coalition, but a potentially flexible federalist alignment that can expand around shared constitutional and political grievances. Its deeper significance lies precisely there: Puntland and Jubbaland are seeking to transform federal autonomy from a series of isolated state grievances into a broader bargaining position over who defines the federation, where the boundaries of federal authority lie, and how political power is ultimately distributed within the Somali state.
Ultimately, the significance of this emerging federalist alignment extends beyond Puntland and Jubbaland. The growing involvement of other stakeholders, including Southwest at different moments, increasingly frames the dispute around institutional and constitutional questions: the distribution of powers, state autonomy, electoral arrangements, resource sharing and the procedures for constitutional change. What might once have appeared as separate federal–state confrontations are therefore increasingly becoming a broader contest over the institutional architecture and future direction of Somalia’s federal system.
Hassan Sheikh’s Approach and the Deepening Rupture
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s political strategy has arguably intensified rather than contained this convergence. His government regards constitutional completion, direct elections and stronger national institutions as necessary steps towards completing Somalia’s prolonged transition. Puntland and Jubbaland increasingly interpret many of the same measures differently: as an attempt to reconstruct the federation from the centre without sufficient agreement from its constituent federal members states.
That distinction is fundamental.
The constitutional changes, disputes over electoral models and growing tensions concerning federal and regional security authority have reinforced the perception among Hassan Sheikh’s opponents that the disagreement is no longer about isolated government policies. It concerns the future distribution of political power within Somalia. This produces a dangerous paradox for Hassan Sheikh’s state-building agenda. Measures intended to strengthen the Somali state can weaken the federal project if major constituent states regard the process through which they are introduced as illegitimate.
The harder Mogadishu pushes institutional change without securing sufficient federal political consensus, the stronger the incentive becomes for Puntland and Jubbaland to coordinate. Separate regional grievances can consequently evolve into a common political cause. Centralization intended to strengthen the state may therefore inadvertently consolidate an alternative federalist bloc outside Mogadishu. More importantly for Puntland, every additional confrontation strengthens the argument of those who contend that the federal bargain Puntland entered in 1998 and helped institutionalize nationally has fundamentally changed.
Beyond the dispute over federalism lies a deeper institutional problem, further exacerbated by the current political context: Somalia has yet to establish sufficiently independent national institutions capable of constraining the executive and arbitrating disputes over federal power. Mogadishu is simultaneously the federal capital and the political and security centre of the administration occupying Villa Somalia, giving the executive considerable structural advantage when national disputes are fought largely within institutions concentrated in the capital. Parliament is constitutionally intended to check the executive, yet its ability to act independently becomes questionable when major constitutional and electoral changes closely reflect the government’s political agenda. Somalia also lacks a sufficiently authoritative and trusted constitutional judicial mechanism through which disputes between the Federal Government, Federal Member States and opposition can be conclusively adjudicated. Security institutions consequently become especially important: their role should be to protect Parliament, the courts, political actors and the constitutional order impartially, rather than becoming instruments within political competition. The institutional concern, therefore, is not simply whether Hassan Sheikh’s government is powerful, but whether Somalia possesses institutions sufficiently independent of any incumbent president to limit that power, resolve disputes and remain credible to political actors outside Villa Somalia. Without those safeguards, strengthening the federal centre can easily be perceived as strengthening the presidency rather than strengthening the Somali state.
Political Settlement as the Remaining Federal Bridge
Yet the deepening rupture does not mean Puntland has exhausted the federal option. Before reconsidering its place in Somalia, one important pathway remains: an inclusive political settlement capable of renewing national legitimacy and reopening the unfinished federal bargain.
Puntland itself has placed this option first. In its 13 September 2026 letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the President of the Security Council, Puntland's first demand was support for urgent and inclusive Somali political dialogue, including a transitional roadmap and internationally supported mediation around elections and the wider political settlement. Significantly, the letter reaffirmed Puntland's commitment to a stable, democratic and federal Somalia, while warning that continued failure to achieve an inclusive settlement could eventually force it to reconsider its relationship with Mogadishu.
That sequencing matters. Puntland is placing political settlement before separation. Its position is effectively that the federal relationship is approaching a dangerous threshold, but that an agreed national process can still prevent that threshold from being crossed.
Elections provide the most practical bridge. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected on 15 May 2022 under the then-existing four-year framework. Puntland, Jubaland and the wider opposition therefore regard his original mandate as having ended on 15 May 2026 and Parliament's on 14 April. The Federal Government contests that interpretation, relying on the 2026 constitutional changes establishing five-year terms. The resulting controversy is consequently larger than an election-date dispute: it concerns whether constitutional changes adopted during an incumbent mandate can alter that mandate when major Federal Member States reject both the process and its application.
An agreed election could move Somalia beyond this competing-legitimacy problem without requiring either side first to surrender its wider constitutional position. Puntland could return to the national process without recognising every constitutional amendment it has contested since 2024; Mogadishu could preserve the transition towards direct elections without requiring Federal Member States to accept the entire constitutional settlement produced at the centre.
Importantly, the electoral positions are no longer irreconcilable. In June 2026, the Somali Future Council—bringing together Puntland, Jubaland and major opposition figures—endorsed a Transitional Direct Elections Model, combining direct public participation with transitional power-sharing safeguards. Independent analysis by Somali Public Agenda and the Puntland Development and Research Centre similarly found significant common ground among competing proposals, including support for direct elections while retaining transitional representation arrangements.
There have also been repeated efforts to negotiate such a compromise. Federal Government and Somali Future Council representatives met in Mogadishu in May 2026, with international partners encouraging an inclusive settlement. The African Union subsequently called for renewed political dialogue, compromise and adherence to constitutional processes, while the UN and other international partners have continued supporting efforts to overcome the electoral deadlock.
The international community cannot determine Somalia's political settlement, nor should it. But where trust between Mogadishu, Puntland, Jubaland and the opposition has deteriorated so severely, external mediation can provide facilitation, electoral assistance and guarantees around implementation. Puntland's appeal to the UN should therefore be understood partly in this context: the problem is no longer simply reaching an agreement but establishing sufficient confidence that an agreement will be respected.
A settlement need not resolve Somalia's entire constitutional crisis at once. It could concentrate on an agreed electoral model and timetable, credible election administration, meaningful Federal Member State participation, transitional representation safeguards and a mechanism for returning unresolved constitutional questions to negotiation after elections.
The sequence would therefore be straightforward: settle the political transition, renew national legitimacy through an agreed election, and negotiate the unfinished federation from that renewed mandate.
For Puntland, this may represent the most important remaining bridge between federal rupture and reconsidering its place within Somalia. Its September UN letter makes that choice particularly clear: political settlement remains the first option; reconsideration of the federal relationship emerges if that avenue ultimately fails. This places responsibilities on both Garowe and Mogadishu. Puntland cannot convincingly declare federalism exhausted while a credible negotiated political settlement remains possible. But Mogadishu equally cannot invoke Somali unity while failing to accommodate the negotiations necessary to keep one of the federation's principal architects invested in it.
Elections therefore matter far beyond determining who occupies Villa Somalia. They have become a test of whether Somalia still possesses the political capacity to resolve fundamental disagreements within one federal system. If an inclusive settlement succeeds, it could provide the political reset from which constitutional and federal reconciliation becomes possible. If even the rules for peacefully transferring national power can no longer be agreed, Puntland's argument that the federal compact itself is failing becomes considerably harder to dismiss.
The Paradox of Puntland’s Independence Argument VS. Puntland’s Capacity
This is where Puntland’s historic commitment to Somali unity becomes central.
Had Puntland pursued separation continuously since 1998, contemporary independence rhetoric could simply be interpreted as the continuation of an established nationalist project. But it did not. Puntland chose federalism when the Somali state barely existed. It participated in rebuilding national institutions, sent its own leaders into national government and repeatedly returned to negotiations after serious disputes with Mogadishu.
That history raises the political threshold considerably.
A region that rejected separation when Somalia was at its weakest cannot easily be accused of abandoning Somalia casually when, nearly three decades later, it begins questioning whether the federal arrangement still serves its original purpose.
Paradoxically, therefore, Puntland’s history of Somali nationalism strengthens rather than weakens the seriousness of its present warning. Its argument would not necessarily be that it always wanted independence, but that the political project to which it committed itself has changed sufficiently to justify reconsidering the terms of that commitment.
Puntland’s capacity makes its argument stronger and is further strengthened politically by the degree of autonomous governance it has developed since 1998. It maintains its own administration and security institutions, has conducted local political processes and has undertaken substantial security operations, including against Islamic State militants in the Cal-Miskaad mountains. The source material describes this record as contributing to an increasing perception of functional self-reliance.
This does not automatically create an entitlement to statehood. But it changes the political calculation.
The longer an administration provides security, institutions and political order largely through its own structures, the harder it becomes to sustain a federal relationship that is locally perceived as imposing obligations without providing reciprocal political influence, constitutional certainty or security benefits.
The immediate danger for Somalia may therefore not even be a formal declaration of Puntland independence. A more plausible intermediate outcome is de facto separation without de jure separation: Mogadishu and Garowe formally remaining within one internationally recognized state while increasingly operating through separate constitutional, political and security systems.
Such an outcome could prove more destabilizing than either a functioning federation or a negotiated political settlement because ambiguity itself would become permanent.
Civilian Demand or Political Demand?
Any serious discussion of Puntland’s independence must ultimately distinguish between political demands articulated by the leadership and a genuine civilian demand emerging from society. Puntland authorities have increasingly invoked public frustration with Mogadishu, and the source material cites a September 2026 communication to the United Nations referring to pressure from large numbers of citizens favouring full independence because of prolonged frustration with Somalia’s state-building process. Yet the scale and depth of that sentiment have not been independently established.
This distinction is crucial. Political leaders can invoke independence as leverage in negotiations with Mogadishu, particularly when constitutional relations have broken down; that is different from a sustained popular movement demanding a separate state. At the same time, it would be equally mistaken to assume that public frustration is merely manufactured by politicians. Decades of constitutional disputes, recurrent breakdowns in federal–state relations, perceptions of centralization, security tensions and disappointment with the unfinished federal project can gradually transform an elite political grievance into a broader societal question. Political demands can generate civilian mobilization, but prolonged civilian frustration can also push political leaders further than they originally intended to go.
For Puntland, therefore, the decisive test cannot be what Garowe says on behalf of its population, but what Puntland’s population itself ultimately chooses. If independence is to move from political bargaining to a credible claim of self-determination, it would require open public debate, political pluralism and, ultimately, a transparent referendum conducted through Puntland’s constitutional procedures. Such a process could also produce the opposite result: Puntlanders may prefer a renegotiated federal settlement, greater autonomy or confederation while remaining within Somalia. The legitimacy of either outcome must come from the people rather than from an assumption that the position of the government and the preference of the governed are necessarily the same.
This distinction also carries a wider lesson for Mogadishu. If independence remains primarily an elite bargaining position, a credible federal settlement may still contain it. But if repeated political ruptures allow that position to develop into a durable civilian demand, the nature of the problem changes fundamentally. The greater danger to Somali unity is therefore not secessionist rhetoric itself, but allowing political frustration with the federation to become sufficiently entrenched that separation begins to acquire popular legitimacy where it historically had little.
The Question Mogadishu Cannot Ignore
Ultimately, Puntland’s strongest argument is not that it has always wanted independence.
It is that it did not.
Its history since 1998 has largely been an attempt to rebuild Somalia rather than abandon it. Puntland created functioning institutions while waiting for the Somali state to re-emerge, helped establish federal institutions when that became possible, contributed leaders and political capital to national reconstruction and repeatedly returned to dialogue even after serious disputes with Mogadishu.
That is precisely why the present rupture deserves to be taken seriously.
If one of the principal architects and longstanding defenders of Somali federalism begins seriously contemplating whether it can continue within the federation—and if that political argument begins moving from government communiqués into wider public sentiment—the problem becomes increasingly difficult to explain simply as regional defiance.
It raises a more uncomfortable question about the federation itself.
Puntland therefore faces a choice, but so does Mogadishu. Puntland must establish whether its population actually wants separation or whether the deeper demand remains a functioning federal settlement. Mogadishu, meanwhile, must decide whether Somali unity is best preserved primarily through asserting authority from the centre or by maintaining sufficient consent among the constituent parts of the federation.
Independence would remain an extraordinary, uncertain and potentially costly step. Puntland’s own history suggests it should be a last rather than first resort. But that same history gives greater weight to its warning.
When a polity that spent nearly three decades resisting secession, constructing federalism and investing in a united Somalia begins contemplating whether it can survive politically outside that project, the most important question is no longer simply why Puntland might want to leave. It is what has happened to the Somali federal project that once gave Puntland compelling reasons to stay.
